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Preface
Visas, Inc. goes behind the scenes of the ad hoc set of visas that are sometimes referred to collectively as the 
“guestworker program.”  It has become a lucrative business for employers, but with high costs for U.S. society 
as well as foreign and American workers.   Employers are driving a system that lacks coherence and has 
serious long-term consequences for the United States. 
Without thoughtful consideration of the future of U.S. labor needs as they were likely to evolve throughout 
the economy, Congress has responded over the years to industry-specific demands and created visas that 
addressed particular issues at particular moments in time.  As the formal “work” visas became more regulated, 
employers learned they could skirt the tougher rules altogether by using other visas that were never intended 
to serve primarily as “work” visas.  The result has been unsatisfactory to almost all the parties involved, especially 
the workers. 
Global Workers Justice Alliance was founded in 2005 to combat worker exploitation by promoting portable 
justice for transnational migrants through a cross-border network of advocates and resources.  As we built a 
network of human rights advocates in the migrant home countries to partner with us to assist migrant workers 
exploited, even trafficked, while in the U.S., we started realizing that the temporary worker visa system was 
deeply flawed and one-sided.  
When we decided to look further into the system what we found was confounding and, ultimately, the reason 
for this report. We discovered a complicated, fragmented system that few understand well.  It was also a place 
that has little room for the interests of foreign workers.  
Now is the time to take a step back and reflect on the broad effects of this ad hoc system.
We hope that this report can help advocates already deeply engaged in the hard policy work on individual 
visas and abuses to see how problems for many different kinds of workers and communities are all connected 
in this chaotic system.  We also hope it encourages new voices in the U.S. and overseas to join this conversa-
tion and work together to find solutions that will eliminate abuses and work better for everyone involved. 
Sincerely,
Cathleen Caron
Founder and Executive Director
Global Workers Justice Alliance
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Executive Summary 
According to the best guess of the U.S. government, somewhere between 700,000 and 900,000 foreign citizens 
are working in the United States on temporary visas.1  They work in every field, from low-skilled, low-wage jobs 
in agriculture, to specialty occupations in health care or information technology. They may be in the public 
sector, employed as teachers in an under-served school district, or in the most private sphere of the private 
sector, as domestic workers living in their employer’s home. 
The temporary foreign labor system that brings in these workers consists of dozens of visa categories and 
sub-categories, for apparently distinct purposes – cultural and educational exchange, employee relocation 
by multinational enterprises, U.S. based training programs and more. But the problems become apparent 
when we examine the structure as a whole – and in particular, its vulnerability to extreme misuse by employers 
eager to use foreign labor in ways that undermine established wages and working conditions in the U.S. As 
far as many of these employers are concerned, the entire framework is one undifferentiated avenue to source 
cheaper and more easily controlled labor:
  U.S. employers have substantial economic incentives, 
built into the visa framework, to hire foreign workers in 
place of a potential or existing U.S. workforce. These 
incentives may be embodied in regulations that 
exempt employers of certain visa workers from payroll 
taxes, for example – or a lack of regulation, enabling 
employers to pay foreign workers far lower wages than 
established for U.S. workers. 
  Foreign workers are wholly dependent on their employer 
for their fragile status in the U.S. As a general matter, if 
they are fired, they must leave the country quickly, or 
face deportation. Combined with other tools of control, 
this creates a culture of fear that effectively prevents 
workers from reporting any abuse or exploitation.
The temporary worker visa system is utterly chaotic, constantly metastasizing to develop more visa categories 
or carve-outs, in response to employer demands. While there is extensive evidence of self-interested employer 
lobbying to expand the system, or employer misuse of the existing system, the ultimate responsibility lies with 
the U.S. government. The United States made a deliberate choice to shape a foreign temporary labor system 
that is heavily privatized, with a minimal role for public regulation and oversight. The U.S. government’s delega-
tion of control over the temporary foreign labor scheme to employers – in spite of the many critical public 
interests at stake – has had dire consequences. 
The U.S. government has long been aware of the enormity of the situation: for nearly every relevant visa 
category, internal governmental reviews document exploitation of foreign workers, and displacement of U.S. 
workers.. Unfortunately, regulatory reforms have typically been meager, in proportion to the problems. For 
example, while the U.S. State Department has acknowledged that many foreign domestic workers entering 
the U.S. in the employ of diplomats have been exploited, and even enslaved, it has failed to address the 
core vulnerability of these workers through provisions for better enforcement and monitoring. Today, the State 
1 Estimates drawn from conversations with U.S. government agencies and secondary research. As detailed in the report, we have to rely on such crude estimates because essential 
data is not collected or shared by the U.S. government. See Footnote 5 for a list of sources.
The size and reach of the temporary 
worker visa system is evidence 
that U.S. immigration policy has 
moved away from its roots in 
permanent labor migration. This 
has happened largely without 
public debate or political acknowl-
edgment.
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Department merely requires that domestic workers have a written contract with the employer before they can 
be granted a visa to enter the U.S.
Governmental oversight is further hobbled by diffusion of responsibility. Regulation and enforcement is 
distributed among multiple agencies – the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Labor – in seemingly haphazard ways that are not consistent across visa categories, and do 
not provide for coordination among the agencies. In the case of the majority of these visas, the one agency 
mandated to protect U.S. and foreign workers – the Department of Labor – has been excluded or pushed 
to the margins.. The absence of clear data further undermines both coordination and public accountability. 
Under the current framework, no one within the U.S. government – let alone the U.S. public – is in a position to 
grasp the dimensions of the temporary foreign labor system, or to analyze its impact.
The fragmentation of oversight is linked intrinsically to the fragmentation of the framework. Rather than 
developing a coherent, unitary system, the U.S. government, responding piecemeal to employer demands, 
created a patchwork of visas subject to distinct rules. Although it is clear that employers have learned to 
exploit the interconnections between these visas, the government continues to treat them as entirely distinct 
of each other. This refusal to regulate the temporary foreign labor system in an integrated way is perhaps the 
most substantial obstacle to meaningful reform and oversight. In the absence of comprehensive attention, 
employers treat these visas interchangeably, substituting reliance on one for another as circumstances – such 
as increased oversight here, or additional fees there – dictate. Analysis and reform must therefore happen 
holistically, if abuse and misuse are to be reined in, with the recognition that these individual visas constitute 
a de facto temporary foreign labor system.
The abuse and misuse associated with temporary foreign labor are closely linked to the larger crisis of decent 
work in the U.S. The shift away from full-time, living wage jobs as the standard for American workers, to ever 
more precarious employment, is only accelerating. The use of temporary foreign labor is not responsible for 
the crisis, but it is both a contributing factor and an alibi. Allowing foreign workers in the U.S. is premised on 
the absence of willing, qualified and available U.S. workers. In reality, however, U.S. workers are actively edged 
out, as this report documents, in several ways:
  Individual U.S. workers are not hired, or are fired on a pretext. A foreign worker is then hired instead.
  Employers exploit visas that were intended for other purposes, and thus do not require a prior effort to hire 
U.S. workers. As a result, in many cases, U.S. workers may not even be aware of their exclusion.
  U.S. workers are pushed out of entire industries and regions by the systematic erosion of wages and under-
lying work conditions. This is followed by the recruitment of foreign workers.
Foreign workers, in turn, are vulnerable to abuse throughout their involvement with temporary work in the U.S. 
The problems begin prior to departure, and extend beyond their return to their home countries:
  Prior to departure, workers are in the power of recruiters, who promise them employment opportunities 
in the U.S. in exchange for a substantial fee. In the absence of U.S. government regulation of recruiters 
(through provisions holding U.S. employers liable for any abuses by their recruiters, for example), there is 
total impunity. Many workers have been defrauded by recruiters who take their fees and then disappear. 
Other problems include gross discrimination: women workers accounted for only 3.7% of visas issued for 
agricultural labor in 2010,2  though advocate interviews suggested that women could represent up to 
40% of the pool of job-seekers.
  On arrival, workers face economic exploitation at the hands of employers who know that individuals on 
temporary work visas have no recourse against either abuse or retaliation. Illegal deductions and wage 
theft are extremely common. 
  While working, occupational health and safety violations are frequent, especially among “unskilled” workers. 
The problems arise, in part, from the very fact that the U.S. government allows risky work to be categorized 
as “unskilled.”3  
2 Website of Global Workers Justice Alliance, data on U.S. migration, available at http://www.globalworkers.org/migrationdata_US_more.html#DOS. 
3 Interview with Bridgette Carr, director of the Human Trafficking Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School.
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  The impact of exploitation and abuse in the U.S. can be life long. For example, injured workers find it nearly 
impossible to access workers’ compensation benefits once they return to their home countries.  The U.S. 
insistence on treating the temporary foreign labor framework as a series of private employment arrange-
ments, rather than a governmental program, means that there are no agreements in place with foreign 
governments to enable social protection schemes, even though workers may have a legal entitlement. 
There are several measures that the U.S. government should take to fix the system:
  There are short-term steps that could translate into immediate improvements in oversight and governance. 
The Department of Labor must be integrated into regulation and enforcement of all visa categories that 
enable temporary work in the U.S. It must have the resources and powers to assess the potential displace-
ment of U.S. workers, as well as to enforce appropriate wages and working conditions for foreign workers. 
In order to promote greater accountability to the public, the U.S. must release consolidated and consistent 
data in a timely manner about the use of these visas, including the names of employers currently recruiting 
foreign workers.
  In the medium term, the U.S. government should undertake a systematic and sustained review of the 
temporary foreign labor visas to bring them in line with broader U.S. labor market policy. A helpful model 
would be the “permanent, independent Commission on Foreign Workers,”proposed by former Secretary 
of Labor Ray Marshall and the Economic Policy Institute,4  to collect data on labor shortages, the use of 
temporary work visas, and the economic impact of temporary foreign workers in the U.S.
  The long-term goal of reform should be a single visa system with uniform oversight, to replace the current 
patchwork of visas, each subject to separate regulations. Consistent public administration, rather than the 
delegation of essential responsibilities to private entities, is critical. The U.S. should engage systematically 
with foreign governments whose citizens work here, and should conclude agreements that (1) provide 
for cooperation on preventing abuse, and (2) enable access to social security benefits and workers’ 
compensation schemes. 
The size and reach of the temporary worker visa system is evidence that U.S. immigration policy has moved 
away from its roots in permanent labor migration. This has happened largely without public debate or political 
acknowledgment. At a minimum, it is time to renew the national conversations related to broad issues of 
immigration and labor in the U.S.
4 Ray Marshall, Value Added Immigration: Lessons for the United States from Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, Economic Policy Institute, 2011.
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Introduction
At this moment, between 700,000 and 900,000 foreign citizens are working in the United States, on visas 
that are structured around the expectation that these workers will eventually return to their home countries.5 
These individuals are not “immigrants,” arriving with the expectation that they will eventually be able to make 
their home here, as permanent residents or citizens. Nor are they “undocumented,” “unauthorized,” or “illegal” 
workers, who may have a tourist visa, an expired visa, or have entered the country with no visa at all.6  Rather, 
“guestworkers,” or “temporary foreign workers,”7  are in the U.S. on visas that are explicitly designed to come to 
an end. As a phenomenon, temporary foreign workers are present across almost every conceivable category 
of the U.S. labor market. They work in low-skilled, low-wage jobs such as agricultural labor, as well as in specialty 
occupations such as computer programming. They may be in the public sector, employed as teachers in an 
under-served school district, or in the most private sphere of the private sector, as domestic workers living in 
their employer’s home. Their jobs may be extremely short-term, lasting for no more than a few months, or they 
may span several years at a stretch. 
Conversations about the system of temporary worker visas often touch a nerve, for different reasons. For some, 
the mere existence of the temporary worker system may come as a shock, as a marker of the demise of our 
ideal of the U.S. as a nation of immigrants. “A nation of temporary labor migrants?” mused a professor of U.S. 
history, expressing surprise at the sheer number of workers present on these visas. “It doesn’t quite roll off the 
tongue.” The connotations of a government program that enables employers to “import” workers without 
then allowing those workers a road to full citizenship troubles others, who recall a more grim history of the U.S. 
For them, the system may have echoes of the U.S. government’s equivocal relationship to the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade, or later, to Chinese workers on contracts of indenture for the benefit of employers in plantations, 
railroads or mines, and then denied naturalization under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Yet others, including 
scholars of international development, worry about the impact of the modern phenomenon of temporary 
labor migration on workers’ home countries, and wonder how the costs – divided households, and the flight 
of human capital – can be weighed against the benefit of money and skills that workers bring home.
These critical debates about temporary foreign workers in the United States have not yet entered the mainstream, 
due to a number of factors, including a lack of comprehensive data, and the fragmentation of interest among 
different constituencies. Historically, for example, those concerned about migrant farmworkers would have 
had few reasons to focus on professional and technical workers temporarily in the U.S. This report seeks to 
respond to the lack of comprehensive information and analysis, and contribute toward efforts to catalyze a 
new national conversation about these visas, in the context of broader immigration and labor policy in the U.S.
5 Estimates drawn from conversations with U.S. government agencies and secondary research. In the case of approximately 350,000 individuals who entered the U.S. in 2010, their 
visa status indicates clearly that they came for the purposes of work (H-2A, H-2B, H-1B. L-1, A-3, G-5, R-1 among others), see U.S. State Department, “Non Immigrant Visa Statistics, Detail 
Table by Visa Class and Nationality for FY2010,” available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY10NIVDetailTable.pdf. In addition, at least 300,000 of the J-1 “cultural and educational 
exchange” visa holders who entered the U.S. are engaged in the U.S. labor market (see Daniel Costa, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #317, Guestworker Diplomacy: J visas 
receive minimal oversight despite significant implications for the U.S. labor market, 14 July 2011, p.1). Estimates of F-1 students working, through “practical training” programs, are well 
over 60,000 a year (see Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, International Students: By Academic Level, 1979-2010, avail-
able at http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/By-Academic-Level/1979-2010) Government officials indicated that up to 20,000 of 
the B-1 visas issued in 2010 enabled visa holders to engage in paid work.
6 Following the position outlined by Beth Lyon, this report uses the term “unauthorized worker” to describe “anyone whom immigration laws forbid to work for pay.” By contrast, “undocu-
mented immigrants” are those who “presently possess no proof of any right to be present in the United States, whether or not they have been declared deportable by the U.S. govern-
ment.” As she describes, “immigrants who are unauthorized to work are not all undocumented and those who are undocumented did not all enter the country illegally,” and for a 
range of policy reasons laid out in greater detail in her article, it would be a mistake to conflate the two categories. See Beth Lyon, “When More ‘Security’ Equals Less Workplace Safety: 
Reconsidering U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor & Employment Law, Spring 2004, p.583 and more generally.
7 Researchers, advocates and policy makers on migration issues tend to use “guestworker” or “temporary worker,” some interchangeably, to describe programs where, as Philip 
Martin says, “migrants are expected to work one or more years abroad and then return to their countries of origin.” (See Philip Martin, Managing Labor Migration: Temporary Worker 
Programmes for the 21st Century, International Institute for Labour Studies, September 2003. p.2.) Many find the term “guestworker” an unacceptable euphemism for programs that, in 
practice, have been abusive of workers. Those who oppose all such programs as fundamentally unprincipled labor and immigration policy may object to either term. This report tries 
to use “temporary foreign worker,” and “temporary worker” as relatively neutral categories.
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Many of the specific problems identified in this report will not come as a surprise to informed observers. For 
example, a report on “temporary foreign worker” programs around the world has noted of the U.S. visa system 
that
“Temporary and seasonal worker programmes in the United States have mostly resulted in wins only for 
employers: who keep workers captive, pay them lower wages than native workers, and deprive the latter 
of jobs by making some permanent jobs into temporary ones with poorer working conditions.”8
But that report is speaking only of the problems with those visas formally acknowledged by the U.S. to be for 
temporary or seasonal work, which arguably have some provisions to protect foreign workers, as well as U.S. 
workers at risk of being displaced. These relatively regulated visas – known collectively as the “H” visas – are 
just the tip of an iceberg, however, as documented in this report. The “H” visas alone account for the entry 
of more than 200,000 workers every year. However, there are more than a dozen other visa categories, many 
with no meaningful oversight, which bring in at least half a million more workers. 
A handful of lawyers, journalists, academic researchers, trade unions and government officials within the U.S. 
as well as workers’ home countries have litigated, organized, written, and lobbied for change. However, the 
analysis and the advocacy has not, thus far, been able to encompass the sheer magnitude of the problem, 
with good reason: the work by its very nature has focused on workers from particular countries, or in particular 
industries, or on particular visas – especially the “H” visas. 
This report draws on in-depth interviews with these advocates and experts, as well as independent analysis, 
to piece together a fuller picture of the visa framework, the abuses under it, and the broader implications. 
Bringing these perspectives together, we are able to see a whole that is even more dysfunctional than the 
sum of its parts. 
While the combined insights of advocates, speaking from multiple perspectives and multiple countries, do 
come together in a powerful condemnation of the current system, they go beyond critique to frame different 
elements of the transformations necessary to make it better. The main recommendations that emerge can 
be summarized as follows:
  We need a clearer rationale for these visas. While the general public may be aware that some number of 
workers come to the U.S. on a temporary basis to meet fluctuating labor shortages, they may not realize 
how poorly defined a “labor shortage” actually is, in existing policies and regulations. There is still less aware-
ness that employers are able to side-step the requirement of demonstrating a labor shortage, through an 
array of visas that were intended for purposes such as cultural exchange or training, but are functionally 
supplementing access to foreign workers. 
  We need a more coherent and better supervised visa system. As matters stand, the temporary visa “system” 
in the U.S. consists of dozens of visa categories and sub-categories, framed to meet different and often 
conflicting goals. This incoherence only serves the interest of unscrupulous employers, who are largely free 
to shop among these visas for the least onerous regulations. A constellation of different special interests 
– individual industries, or individual companies – have even lobbied successfully in Washington D.C. for 
new visa categories and sub-categories, further exacerbating the lack of a uniform vision.
  We need to address loopholes that hurt U.S. and foreign workers. There are profound gaps in U.S. govern-
ment oversight of these visas. Poorly-framed regulations have created unfair competition between U.S. 
workers and foreign workers, who are made structurally cheaper and easier to exploit. There are a range of 
unintended economic incentives for employers to hire foreign workers, including, for example, exemptions 
from payroll taxes under many temporary work visa categories, or provisions that allow basic employment-
related costs to be shifted from employers to workers. In addition, there are legal and practical barriers 
inhibiting temporary foreign workers from complaining about violations, such as wage theft, or organizing 
in defense of their rights. At the most fundamental level, there is the fear of being fired in retaliation, and 
then promptly deported: in almost all cases, a temporary workers’ immigration status is dependent on a 
continuing relationship with the employer.
8 Piyasiri Wickramasekara, Circular Migration: A Triple Win or a Dead End? Global Union Research Network, Discussion Paper 15, 2011. p.2.
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  We need systems of cooperation between the U.S. government and workers’ home country governments. 
The U.S. treats the arrangement between employers and temporary foreign workers as a purely private 
one, and restricts its own role in the process to the granting or denial of the work visa. Thus, there are no 
negotiated structures to facilitate foreign government efforts to protect their citizens working in the U.S. 
For example, the U.S. State Department does not even share information with workers’ home countries 
on the numbers of people granted visas, or the location of their employer in the U.S.; it does not check 
to determine whether employers have violated laws in the home country related to the recruitment of 
migrant workers, prior to granting a visa. Effectively, foreign governments are forced to participate in a 
race to the bottom, competing with each other to lure employers. They are all too aware that, under the 
current system, employers in the U.S. are free to look elsewhere for workers to import, if a country is too 
vocal in defense of its citizens abroad.
On these issues and many others, there is substantial agreement. At the same time, it cannot be denied that 
there are a number of competing interests within the U.S., as well as between U.S. and workers’ home country 
advocates, with respect to temporary foreign workers. Such debates are documented in this report, to the extent 
that they inform its primary focus: U.S. law and policy related to the temporary worker visa system. Ultimately, 
the report highlights the imperative of coordination, both within the U.S. and across borders, if the system is 
to be changed in ways that are truly responsive to the scale of the problem before us. 
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Methodology
This report is the product of research conducted between March 2011 and March 2012 by Ashwini Sukthankar, 
a consultant for the Global Workers Justice Alliance, partnering with Philip J. Simon, a lawyer and researcher on 
employment rights and international migration, based in Geneva. This report references extensive regulatory 
analyses conducted by Philip Simon, looking closely at the history and workings of individual visa categories. 
Since this report is written for a broad audience, this detailed analysis of the visa categories is a separate 
resource, available online on the Global Workers website.9 
The report draws on over 100 interviews conducted with advocates, researchers and government officials 
in the U.S., and in the course of travel to China, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Mexico and the Philippines. The 
research conducted in workers’ home countries was particularly important in framing a nuanced picture, 
since advocates and government agencies there have access to a broad range of workers’ perspectives 
on return, a richer understanding of the socio-political context for workers’ decisions to seek employment in 
the U.S., and a different perspective on the potential constraints on taking action to protect workers or seek 
remedies for abuse.
The “home” countries selected for this research – China, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Mexico and the Philip-
pines – have different histories of migration to the U.S., different visa categories that their migrants rely on 
today, and different understandings of what changes need to take place in order for the U.S. to move closer 
to a system that works. For each, the U.S. is just one of the countries with which it has a relationship of migrant 
labor, and the ways in which these other migrations take place – documented or undocumented, temporary 
or permanent, whether there are also migrants coming in, and not just going out – are also part of the context 
within which the U.S. system is compared and judged. The decision to focus on these particular countries 
reflects the following:
  Mexico – sends the vast majority of H-2 workers.10  There has also been extensive research and advocacy 
around Mexican participants in U.S. temporary work schemes, producing insights that we hoped to draw 
on for this report.
  China – sends a large number of J-1 visa holders on “cultural and educational exchange” programs, as 
well as H-1B “specialty occupation” workers, and F-1 students. 
  India – sends substantial numbers of L-1 “intracompany transferees,” H-1B “specialty occupation” workers, 
and F-1 students who work in the U.S. on “practical training” programs.
  Jamaica – the one country that still has a bilaterally-negotiated migrant worker “program” with the U.S., 
where the Jamaican government plays an extensive role in the management, from recruitment to welfare 
schemes. For that reason, it serves as an interesting point of comparison to the visa schemes that minimize 
government involvement.
  Philippines – sends many teachers and nurses. In addition, there are many different government agencies 
in the Philippines attempting to address different aspects of the problem of regulating circular migration, 
with respect to their own workers abroad, with “labor welfare officers” stationed around the world, including 
the U.S. 
  Guatemala – offers a critical opportunity to understand Central American perspectives on the H-2 visas; 
these perspectives are at risk of being obscured in the attention that is given to the Mexico-U.S. relationship. 
9 Website of the Global Workers Justice Alliance, www.globalworkers.org.
10 Website of Global Workers Justice Alliance, http://www.globalworkers.org/migrationdata_US.html. .
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While there were issues raised by home country advocates that lie beyond the scope of this report, for the 
most part, these interviews contained many insights that serve to enrich our conversations on temporary 
foreign workers, and strategies to promote the rights of all those who work in the U.S.
With some exceptions, interviews with U.S. consular officials and meetings with agencies in the U.S. were 
granted on the condition that the information was not for citation or attribution, but background only. A small 
number of advocates and officials from workers’ home countries also requested that their comments be used 
without attribution.
The research did not include outreach to employers, business associations or recruitment agencies. Certainly, 
it would be worth hearing the voices of the many employers intent on doing business in ways that are fair to 
U.S. and foreign workers, who are concerned about competition with enterprises manipulating the temporary 
worker visa system. There are other employers with legitimate complaints that the temporary work visa system 
fails to meet their needs, who are raising concerns about bureaucratic delays and inefficiencies. However, 
an effort to include these perspectives, while maintaining the report’s core focus on workers’ rights, would 
ultimately have done justice to neither. 
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The ABCs of “Temporary Worker” Visas
It is important to understand the many visa categories and sub-categories that constitute the temporary 
foreign worker system, individually and not just in the aggregate. When seen together, the visas represent an 
ad hoc approach to developing a temporary foreign worker system, with little data gathered by the govern-
ment beforehand in order to determine labor market needs, and even less gathered after foreign workers 
arrive, to assess the impact on labor markets. In addition, however, the individual visas have very particular 
weaknesses, and leave U.S. and foreign workers vulnerable in particular ways that require attention.
If we were merely to glance at the descriptions of the visas below, they would seem to address genuine needs 
of particular constituencies in the U.S. The visas appear to respond to local businesses facing a temporary 
labor shortage, universities enrolling foreign students, organizations trying to promote intercultural exchange 
and understanding, and religious institutions seeking clergy for worship and pastoral care. 
From the perspective of some employers in the U.S. these visas are largely interchangeable, serving only as 
avenues to cheap, disposable and easily controlled labor.
Even before scrutinizing the details of how U.S. and 
foreign workers have fared in practice, a closer look at 
the history and stated intent of these visas, the framing of 
the regulations, and the government’s own data, raises 
serious concerns about whose interests are actually 
being served, and at what cost. It is not illegitimate to 
shape visas that are responsive to the genuine absence 
of U.S. workers. But it is telling that, in the case of most of 
these visas, attentiveness to employers’ demands is not 
accompanied by any calibrated determinations of labor 
shortages, or protections for foreign workers’ rights. The visas generally provide the maximum possible flexibility 
for employers, with a minimum of oversight.
Another common feature of these visas further highlights the entire system’s focus on employer interests: the 
visas are tied to the employer. That is to say, for almost all foreign workers, their immigration status essentially 
belongs to their employer, and there is limited or no ability to change jobs. Workers are extremely vulner-
able to exploitation, since they cannot easily leave and seek fairer treatment elsewhere. There could be an 
alternative, if the U.S. chose to see temporary foreign worker arrangements as something other than private 
contracts between employers and employees: the visa framework could allow foreign workers to leave their 
employment for other opportunities in the same sector, or the same region, through channels supervised by 
the Department of Labor if necessary.
As noted above, there are many subtle differences among the separate visa categories that create very 
specific problems, and the larger dimension should not blind us to particular flaws within individual visas, or 
groups of visas. Especially of note are the visas outside Department of Labor supervision. Under these visas, 
workers who enter are structurally cheaper than U.S. workers, because employers are legally exempted from 
certain payroll taxes, legally able to pay wages lower than fair market wages, and/or legally empowered 
to pass on many basic costs associated with employment – such as transportation, visa fees, housing and 
more – to the workers. And, since employers are legally able to hire foreign workers without advertising domesti-
From the perspective of some 
employers in the U.S. these visas 
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cally first, the terrain shifts from one of unfair competition, for U.S. workers, to one where they are simply excluded 
from the competition altogether. 
The following section describes the primary visa categories that are used to bring foreign workers to the U.S., 
focusing on the legal framing, and current regulations. The discussion of how workers actually experience 
these visas is deferred until later in this report.
Formal “work” visas
The modern “guestworker” system in the U.S. has its roots in temporary labor programs designed to supply 
employers with agricultural workers: the so-called “bracero” program, which brought in workers from Mexico, 
from 1941 to 1964, and the British West Indies Labor Program, initiated in 1943, which continues to bring in 
Jamaican agricultural workers today.11  Following the establishment of these agricultural worker programs, the 
proliferation of other visa categories quickly followed, as employers in other sectors sought their own avenues 
to cheap and transient labor.12  They also vigorously resisted any regulations that might have allowed these 
visas to serve the interests of foreign and U.S. workers, and not just their own, as documented below.
Most visible to the general public are the “H” visas, which constitute the formal temporary labor system. These 
are designed to bring in “unskilled” workers, as well as workers with special skills, for short periods of time 
that correspond in theory to the fluctuating needs of the labor market – defined as the availability of willing, 
qualified and available U.S. workers. In addition to framing a role for the Department of Labor in determining 
whether such labor shortages exist, the “H” visa regulations give the agency responsibility for trying to ensure 
that foreign workers are not exploited, by overseeing wage levels, hours of work, and conditions of work. 
H-2A: Agricultural Workers
In 2010, almost 56,000 H-2A visas were issued. These visas bring in agricultural workers for every conceivable 
crop in every state of the United States, from apples to oranges, onions to tobacco. More than 90% of these 
workers come from Mexico. 
Hard-won protections for U.S. and foreign agricultural workers, overseen by the Department of Labor, include 
provisions to promote the recruitment of U.S. workers, and measures to ensure that H-2A workers do not receive 
lower wages and poorer working conditions than U.S. workers in comparable jobs. In recognition of how 
low the wages are in the sector, the regulations require that employers cover visa costs and transportation 
fees, and exempt workers from the payment of social security and income tax. However, H-2A workers are 
not covered under the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, which grants other workers in this sector a set of 
critical workplace protections, including the right to sue farm labor contractors or employers in federal court 
to enforce the provisions of the Act.13
H-2B: Non-Agricultural Workers
The H-2B visa, created in 1987, allows employers to fill low-wage non-agricultural jobs with foreign workers, to 
meet temporary or seasonal needs. More than 70% of the 66,000 workers who are permitted to enter under 
this visa come from Mexico. (In some years, the number of H-2B workers has been almost twice as high, under 
a controversial exemption that allowed workers who had used the visa before to enter again without being 
subject to the cap) H-2B workers serve a host of different industries, although landscapers, amusement park 
operators, forestry and the hospitality sector are the major employers by far. 
As initially framed, the regulations did not require the employer to meet the expenses of housing, travel, visa 
fees or any of the other costs associated with bringing in foreign workers. The Obama administration’s Depart-
11 Cindy Hahamovitch, No Man’s Land: Jamaican Guestworkers in America and the Global History of Deportable Labor, Princeton University Press, 2011.
12 See e.g. Vernon Briggs, “Guestworker Programs: Lessons from the Past and Warnings for the Future,” March 2004, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back304.html. .
13 United States Code, 29 U.S.C. § 1854(a): “Maintenance of civil action in district court by aggrieved person: Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or any regulation under 
this chapter by a farm labor contractor, agricultural employer, agricultural association, or other person may file suit in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy and without regard to the citizenship of the parties and without regard to exhaustion of any alternative administrative remedies 
provided herein.”
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ment of Labor has moved to bring protections for H-2B workers in line with those available under the H-2A, 
particularly with respect to these fees, and in terms of prevailing wage guarantees.  It did so, both to protect 
foreign workers who should not have to bear expenses that are fundamentally for the employer’s benefit, 
and to protect U.S. workers from competition with foreign workers who are made artificially cheaper when 
they are forced to absorb these costs. However, employers have fought back against these reforms through 
aggressive lobbying and litigation.
H-1B: Specialty Occupations
The inception of the H-1B visa in 1990, for workers with special skills, reflected the demands of the high-tech 
industry at the height of the boom, and more than 45% of the workers entering the U.S. annually under this 
visa hold jobs in systems analysis, programming or other computer-related work.  H-1B workers born in India, 
China, Canada and the Philippines account for almost two-thirds of all visas issued. Congress set a cap of 
85,000 new workers per year for this visa, but has allowed up to 195,000 in certain years.
While this visa, as framed, is for specialty occupations requiring “theoretical and practical application of 
a body of highly specialized knowledge,”14  the Department of Labor’s H-1B database shows hundreds of 
entry-level positions, at entry-level hourly rates, including cooks ($11), pharmacist interns ($11), and market 
research analysts ($11.33).15  This visa also brings in public school teachers and nurses, who may well meet 
a critical need, but do not fit easily in the stated purpose of the visa. H-1B workers would seem to be less 
vulnerable than “unskilled” workers – and indeed, they have somewhat more flexibility to change jobs without 
fear of losing their visa status, and having to leave the country. However, the Department of Labor provides 
that “the employer may contract with the worker to receive liquidated damages in the event of a premature 
termination on the part of the worker,”16  giving its blessing to heavy fees for breach of contract. These breach 
of contract provisions serve as an equally effective means of keeping the worker bound to the employer.
...other work visas
The formal temporary labor visas are heavily supple-
mented by a lesser-known set of temporary work 
visas. As inventoried by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Citizenship and Immigration Services,17  these 
visas appear somewhat erratic in terms of motivation, 
creating discrete categories for:
  Workers from specific countries: E-3 visas for skilled 
workers from Australia, TN visas for skilled workers from 
Canada and Mexico.
  Employers in specific regions of the U.S. and its territo-
ries: CW-1 visas for workers employed in the Northern 
Mariana Islands.
  Specific occupations: I visas for foreign media, O 
visas for individuals with “extraordinary ability or 
achievement,” P visas for athletes, entertainers and 
performers, R visas for religious workers.
  Specific business interests: E-1 and E-2 visas for the 
foreign employees of traders and investors in the U.S., 
14 Website of the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,” available at http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/faqsan-
swers.cfm#h1b1.
15 See H-1B data regularly posted by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, available at http://www.foreign-
laborcert.doleta.gov/quarterlydata.cfm.  See also Sharon Machlis, “H-1B visa data: Visual and interactive tools,” in Computerworld, 17 November 2010.  See also Ron Hira, Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, “H-1B Visas: Designing a Program to Meet the Needs of 
the U.S. Economy and U.S. Workers,” 31 March 2011, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Hira03312011.pdf.
16 U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Frequently Asked Questions and Answers.”
17 See “Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers,” on the website of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c
6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=13ad2f8b69583210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=13ad2f8b69583210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD.
Why Department of Labor oversight matters
The Department of Labor’s role, with respect to temporary work 
visas, is to protect the interests of both U.S. workers and foreign 
workers. Protecting U.S. workers entails ensuring that they have 
the opportunity to be hired for a job before the employer is 
entitled to seek foreign workers. A critical element of limiting 
unfair competition from foreign workers in this process involves 
verifying that the employer is paying “prevailing wages” for the 
job. By determining what U.S. workers in a particular industry 
and in a particular region are paid for their work, and requiring 
that employers seeking temporary foreign workers pay the same 
rate, the Department of Labor attempts to prevent employers 
from driving down wages, and forcing U.S. workers to compete 
with an artificially cheaper foreign workforce. It should be 
acknowledged that the agency has not been very successful 
in this regard: it is under-resourced for the magnitude of the 
task it faces, and lacks the tools necessary for meaningful 
enforcement. But, in terms of the necessity for democratically 
accountable and transparent oversight of workers’ rights under 
the temporary visa system, it is the only option available.  
The functioning of L-1 “body shops”
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L visas for employees transferred by a multinational 
company from its operation abroad to its operation 
in the U.S.
Although U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
recognizes that these visas are for the purposes of 
“temporary work” in the United States, there is little or 
no oversight by the Department of Labor. 
No clear organizing principle, or animating logic, unites 
this group of “other” temporary work visas. For the 
purposes of this section, which is designed to indicate 
regulatory gaps and lapses in particular visa catego-
ries, we explore just one – the L-1 – since it serves to 
illustrate the typical opportunities for abuse and fraud 
in work visas that exclude the Department of Labor. 
The accompanying text box, on the Q visa, exemplifies 
another important dimension of these visas: their very 
existence is an indicator that the framework is captive 
to narrow business interests. 
L-1: Intracompany Transferees
The L-1 visa was created in 1970 for the ostensible 
purpose of allowing companies to bring top-level inter-
national executives and managers to work in the U.S. 
for short-term postings.22  Since then it has morphed 
into a much broader program, adding categories 
for skilled workers and L-1 spouses.23  At its peak, this category resulted in the issuance of 84,532 visas; the 
numbers have diminished slightly in the wake of the recession. Eight of the top ten requesting companies are 
multinational “business process outsourcing” companies, headquartered abroad.24
18 Kit Johnson, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas,” Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, p.915 (2011) at p.922 (quoting U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO/NSIAD-90-61, “U.S. Information 
Agency: Inappropriate Uses of Educational and Cultural Exchange Visas” (1990)).
19 Kit Johnson, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas,”  pp.935-36.
20 Kit Johnson, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas,”  p.935.
21 Kit Johnson, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas,” pp.930-1.
22 U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 9: Visas, revised 9 March 2012, at 9 FAM 41.54 N1.
23 Ruth Wassem, Congressional Research Service, Immigration Policy for Intracompany Transfers (L Visa): Issues and Legislation, 15 May 2006, p.2.
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses of the L-1 Visa Program, 24 January 2006, p.3, available at  
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/katovrsght/OIG_06-22_Jan06.pdf..
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Distinctively Disney: The creation of the Q Visa
The Q visa is surely the quintessential “special interest” visa 
created for the benefit of employers – or rather, for a specific 
employer – enabling them to bring in workers while avoiding 
many workplace regulations. This visa, framed for the purposes 
of advancing “cultural exchange,” (like the J-1, discussed below) 
was the product of extensive lobbying by Disney, which sought 
to bring in cultural ambassadors to staff its Epcot Center, begin-
ning in the late 1980s. The visa category was inserted into the 
Immigration Act of 1990, despite extensive government scrutiny 
of J-1 misuse by amusement park operators. The General 
Accounting Office (now known as the Government Account-
ability Office) had noted that “Authorizing J visas for participants 
and activities that are not clearly for educational and cultural 
purposes as specified in the act dilutes the integrity of the J 
visa and obscures the distinction between the J visa and other 
visas granted for work purposes.”18  The Q visa has served Disney 
very well indeed. In 2007, it received 54% of the 2412 Q visas 
issued.19  The two “controlling considerations” for approval of 
the visa are “public accessibility” and the “cultural exchange 
value” provided by the sponsoring organizing – both of which 
neatly describe Disney’s Epcot Center.20  It is not clear how 
much money Disney saves by using foreign workers, but one 
credible estimate puts the figure at $17 million every year. 21
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Employers readily acknowledge that the L-1 visa is an easier and cheaper alternative to bring workers into 
the U.S. than the more demanding H-1B visa process.25  The Department of Labor has no authority to monitor 
whether employers are refusing to hire U.S. workers, or actively replacing them, or to ensure that foreign workers 
receive the prevailing wage for the industry. There is also no cap on the number of visas issued under this 
category. Some employers are even entitled to submit “blanket petitions” for multiple workers, who can then 
be brought in on short notice.26  This essentially means that, under the L-1, employers can replace U.S. workers 
en masse with foreign workers who can be – and often are – paid home country wages.27  In one case, the 
transferees received one-sixth of the pay of the U.S. workers they replaced.28  Employers are even free to use L-1 
visa holders to replace workers on strike. The incoming foreign workers are then captive to the employer, since 
they do not have the right to change jobs without losing their visa. The agencies overseeing these visas – the 
State Department and the Department of Homeland Security – have been paying attention in recent years 
to the issue of fraud, which is known to be rife, with companies functioning as “multinational temp agencies,” 
or “body shops.” Such companies will bring in thousands of workers, claiming that it is for their own corporate 
purpose, and will then deploy them to other businesses, with the “temp agency” taking a substantial “place-
ment fee” from each corporate client, every time a worker is re-deployed.
“Definitely not for work” visas
Even further in the shadows are visas framed without any acknowledgment that they are for the purposes 
of work at all. These include J-1 visas for “educational and cultural exchange,” A-3, B-1 and G-5 visas for the 
“personal servants” accompanying individuals temporarily in the U.S., and F-1 visas for students. 
For these visas, work is treated as subsidiary to their larger goal: diplomatic relations (A-3, G-5), cultural exchange 
(J-1), the facilitation of commerce (B-1) or studying in the U.S. (F-1). Like the other work visas, they do not carve 
out a role for the Department of Labor. The first four are overseen primarily by the State Department, and the 
last by the Department of Homeland Security, through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
Unfortunately, not only is there no Department of Labor oversight of these visas, but the “larger goal” has 
functioned to deflect any efforts to focus scrutiny on violations of workers’ rights in the operation of these visas. 
Needless to say, the failure to regulate or even properly acknowledge the work performed under these visas 
not only creates fertile terrain for abuse, but also erodes the credibility of the professed purpose that the visa 
program was intended to serve.  
B-1: Business Visitors
The B-1visa was created to allow foreign nationals to enter the U.S. for business purposes. It is often issued in 
combination with a B-2 visa (intended primarily for tourists) so that the two are generally referred to together, 
as a B-1/B-2 “business and pleasure” visa. Although the B-1 in theory bars visitors from engaging in day-to-day 
work in a U.S. job, the State Department has created a set of B-1 exceptions that allow paid work in the U.S. 
These exceptions threaten to eclipse the whole, if not in number, then certainly in terms of clarity of purpose. 
With respect to numbers, there is no way of assessing the scale of the B-1 exceptions, since the State Depart-
ment does not count (let alone disclose) how many of the 40,000 B-1 visas issued annually allow paid work.
There are two types of B-1 exceptions that permit paid work in the U.S. One type allows the primary B-1/B-2 
visa holder, temporarily in the U.S. for business or pleasure, to be accompanied by a B-1 “personal servant.” 
The lack of a protective framework for so-called personal servants has, in many documented cases, enabled 
actual enslavement. The other type of B-1 exception is issued “in lieu of” H-category work visas. These “in lieu 
of” visas essentially allow employers to bring in “H” workers without having any restrictions imposed on them 
by the Department of Labor. There are two such visas:
25 See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, “Firms find skilled-worker visas too hard to get,” The Boston Globe, 24 March 2008.
26 Code of Federal Regulations related to “Intracompany transferees (executives, managers, and specialists),” revised 4 January 2011, 22 C.F.R. § 41.54.
27 Daniel Costa, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #275, Abuses in the L-1 Visa Program: Undermining the U.S. Labor Market, 13 August 2010, p.4.
28 Daniel Costa, Abuses in the L-1 Visa Program, p.9.
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  B-1 “in lieu of” the H-1B, which permits holders to perform specialized work, without H-1B caps on numbers 
or prevailing wage guarantees.
  B-1 “in lieu of” H-3, which allows for job-related training in the U.S. The vague definition of what might consti-
tute “training,” or what a “trainee” should be paid, has allowed conditions of virtual enslavement.29
Even the State Department, which oversees these visas, admits that these exceptions open the door to 
confusion. Its Foreign Affairs Manual, designed to provide guidance for staff, notes that “[i]t can be difficult 
to distinguish between appropriate B-1 business activities,” that are permissible under this visa, and activities 
that “constitute skilled or unskilled labor” in the U.S., which are barred.30
A-3/ G-5/ B-1: Domestic Workers
The U.S. allows people into the country for domestic work – household cleaning, child care, elder care etc. 
– only as dependents and household members of a primary visa holder. The A-3 visa allows entry for the 
“attendants, servants, personal employees” 31 of a diplomat or foreign government official; a G-5 visa for the 
domestic workers of employees of international organizations; and a B-1 – mentioned above – for domestic 
workers accompanying visitors to the U.S. The problem, as the State Department has noted, is that the U.S. does 
not treat domestic work as work: it does not “offer protection to domestic workers under prevailing labor laws, 
[instead] perceiving their work as something other than regular employment.”32
In the wake of scandals related to extreme underpayment, physical abuse and even trafficking of domestic 
workers, the State Department has issued guidelines for consular officials, noting that they must ensure that A-3 
and G-5 domestic workers have a signed contract with their employer.33  There is no enforcement mechanism 
in place, however, to ensure that domestic workers are actually able to enjoy their contractual rights once 
in the U.S. As noted by one State Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, “There is no way 
any of them are being paid prevailing U.S. wage – but since they don’t get a Social Security number, we can’t 
even check via Social Security deductions.” In any case, it is critical to note, as part of the legal background, 
that many of the diplomats and high-ranking employees of international organizations who employ migrant 
domestic workers in the U.S. have broad immunity from civil and criminal prosecutions34  – serving as another 
obstacle to workers’ efforts to claim their rights.
J-1: Educational and Cultural Exchange Visitors
The J-1 Exchange Visitor Program was established in 1961 with high-minded goals, including “to promote 
international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement,” and “to assist in the development of 
friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and other countries of the world.” 35 
However, a breakdown of the number of J-1 visas issued annually shows that most of the participants come 
to the United States with a promised job – mostly precarious, low-wage work – or in search of one.36  Typically, 
more than 300,000 people participate in the J-1 every year; in 2008, there were as many as 359,447.37
The J-1 visa has 15 sub-categories, with little in common: there are programs for camp counselors, au pairs, 
students working during summer breaks and even doctors and high school teachers. From the perspective 
of the program’s original purpose, it appears to have lost its way, having become a jumble of responses to 
different interest groups. But from the perspective of employers, this translates into a very appealing flexibility. 
Two of the sub-categories illustrate this well:
29 See e.g. Michael A. Scaperlanda et al., “Human Trafficking in the Heartland: Greed, Visa Fraud, and the Saga of 53 Indian Nationals ‘Enslaved’ by a Tulsa Company,” in Loyola University 
Chicago International Law Review Spring/Summer 2005, p.219.
30 U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 41.31 N7(b).
31 United States Code, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A(iii).
32 U.S. State Department, 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report, p.32.
33 U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 41.21 N6.2(a).
34 U.S. State Department, “Immunities and Liabilities Of Foreign Representatives and Officials of International Organizations In The United States,” Foreign Affairs Manual, 2 FAM 230..
35 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, § 2451, Pub. L. No. 87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 33).
36 Interagency Working Group FY 2010 Annual Report at 24-27, available at http://www.iawg.gov/rawmedia_repository/44c4ac01_4486_4a6c_8f03_f6bcb696eda5; Ruth Wassem, 
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, 28 February 2011, p.7. Even J-1 post-secondary students (DOS issued 38,861 of these visas in 2010, 
the second largest J-1 category after summer work students) may work up to twenty hours per week as long as certain minimal requirements are met. 22 CFR § 62.23(g).
37 U.S. State Department, “Non-Immigrant Visas issued FYs 1987-2010,” available at http://www.travel.state.gov/xls/NIVIssuedFYs1987-2010-Detailed.xls.  .
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  An analysis of the au pair38 program indicates the power of certain employer lobbies in the J-1 context. 
The program was initiated in 1985, at the instigation of the American Institute of Foreign Study, a leading 
provider of au pairs to American households. The organization has steadily resisted efforts at regulation 
of working conditions under this program, including calls to reduce working time to 30 hours per week, 
or to limit wage deductions for room and board, noting in a letter to Congress that regulation would be 
improper, since “au pairs are not laborers; they are members of their host family.” As matters currently 
stand, au pairs, who are also supposed to be studying while in the U.S., may be required by their employer 
to work up to 45 hours a week. They are entitled to minimum wage, but up to 40% can be deducted for 
room and board.39 
  The J-1 intern program and trainee program, which places college students and recent graduates with 
employers in the U.S., is also marked by a degree of minimalist regulation that invites abuse of foreign 
workers, and displacement of U.S. workers. As with J-1 summer work students, there are no payroll taxes to 
be paid by the employer. In fact, the program regulations for interns and trainees do not even require that 
they be paid a wage. While the regulations attempt to draw a distinction between “work-based learning” 
which is permitted under the program, and “unskilled labor,”40 which is not, this determination is left to the 
discretion of the sponsor. 
The J-1 is administered in its entirety by the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The 
agency does little by way of enforcement; it has largely relied on self-regulating and self-reporting by the 
dozens of companies and non-profits that serve as “sponsors” for the participants in the programs. So, to the 
extent that the regulations may include lukewarm protections for foreign and U.S. workers – forbidding, for 
example, displacing American workers41 – interpretation of this requirement is left up to the sponsor. Furthermore, 
since the program explicitly relies on these “sponsors” to serve as a primary interface with J-1s, employers are 
insulated from significant liabilities.
There are substantial savings associated with hiring J-1 workers, as alluded to in the context of J-1 interns and 
trainees. Not only are employers exempted from Medicare, Social Security and unemployment taxes, in the 
case of most J-1 sub-categories,, but it is typically participants – rather than employers – who pay application 
fees, travel, housing, and health insurance.42
F-1: Students
It may seem inappropriate to include F-1 students in a catalog of temporary foreign workers. However, this visa 
has come to be widely recognized by all key participants in the visa process – students, schools and even 
the federal government – as another path for foreign nationals to work legally in the U.S. at jobs ranging from 
low-wage retail clerks to skilled information technology positions. These students may work while studying, 
through curricular practical training (CPT) programs, or after graduation, in an optional practical training 
(OPT) program. Neither the Department of Homeland Security nor the State Department will release informa-
tion about the number of F-1 visa holders who work. But a non-governmental organization, the Institute of 
International Education, annually estimates the number of participants in OPT programs, and that number 
alone has tripled in the span of a decade, from 22,745 participants in 2002 to 67,804 in 2010.43
F-1 students are the one category of temporary worker whose visa is not tied to the employer. In theory they 
are, therefore, free to switch employers. However, their visa status is bound to the university where they are 
enrolled, which has resulted in numerous abuses. An abundance of schools, even unaccredited schools, 
has been authorized by the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security to enroll foreign 
students – and many act as third-party brokers charging students a high fee for the opportunity to work in the 
U.S., and then offering them to employers for a further fee.44  Such universities are understandably reluctant 
to relinquish control over the students enrolled with them. In the absence of guidance from the Department 
38 Au pair refers to “exchange visitor programs under which foreign nationals are afforded the opportunity to live with an American host family and participate directly in the home life of 
the host family. All au pair participants provide child care services to the host family and attend a U.S. post-secondary educational institution.” 22 C.F.R. § 62.31.
39 Janie A. Chuang, “Exploitation Diplomacy? Au Pairs in America” (draft; copy on file).
40 Code of Federal Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 62.22 (b)(1)(ii).
41 J-1 Trainees and Interns, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 62: Exchange Visitors, 22 CFR § 62.22 (b)(1)(ii).
42 See generally Code of Foreign Relations 22 C.F.R. § 62.
43 Institute of International Education, Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, International Students: Enrollment Trends, International Students: By Academic Level 
and Place of Origin (2010).
44 T. Bartlett, K. Fischer, and J. Keller, “Little Known Colleges Exploit Visa Loopholes to Make Millions off Foreign Students,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 20 March 2011. See also Lisa Kreiger, 
“Universities or Visa Mills?” MercuryNews.com, 16 July 2011, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci_18492754?nclick_check=1.
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of Labor regarding appropriate wages and working conditions, the limits imposed by the Department of 
Homeland Security are weak at best. For example, Homeland Security maintains that there is “no restriction 
on the number of hours a student can work per week while in CPT,”45 and specifically states that “there is no 
restriction on compensation during CPT,”46 which has meant that F-1 visa holders can work legally for less 
than minimum wage. 
As this brief overview suggests, there is no coherence to the system of visas enabling temporary work in the 
U.S. This overall disarray may be unintentional but it does represent the U.S. government’s conscious refusal 
to develop a real “temporary foreign labor” program – with the coherence, planning and coordination that 
this would require.
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Module 4: Employment and Practical Training, available at  
http://www.ice.gov/exec/sevp/Module4.htm.
46 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Module 4.
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4748
47 U.S. State Department, Non Immigrant Visa Statistics, Detail Table by Individual Class of Admission for FY2006-2010, available at  
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/NIVClassIssued-DetailedFY2006-2010.pdf. 
48 U.S. State Department, Non Immigrant Visa Statistics, Detail Table by Visa Class and Nationality for FY2010, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY10NIVDetailTable.pdf.
Visas Commonly Used for Temporary Foreign Labor
Visas H-2A H-2B H-1B
Employers/ Job 
Positions
Agricultural work, including 
tobacco farms, onion and sweet 
potato farms, and fruit picking
Amusement parks; forestry industry; 
seafood industry; landscaping; 
housekeeping and cleaning; 
groundskeeping ( indust r ia l , 
commerc ia l ) ; cons t ruc t ion ; 
restaurants
Computer programming and 
information technology services; 
a c c o u n t i n g ; e n g i n e e r i n g ; 
physicians and nurses; teachers; 
architectural drafters; cooks; law 
clerks; market research analysis; 





“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporar i ly  to the United 
States to perform agricultural 
labor or services . . . and the 
pressing of apples for cider 
on a farm, of a temporary 
or seasonal nature . . . .” 
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a))
“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporarily to the United States 
to perform other temporary 
service or labor if unemployed 
persons capable of performing 
such service or labor cannot be 
found in this country . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b))
“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporarily to the United States 
to perform services [other 
than H-2A labor or services, 
among other exceptions] . . . 
in a specialty occupation . . . 
or who is coming temporarily 
to the United States to perform 
services as a registered nurse 
. . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b))
# of Visas Issued 
in 2010 by State 
Department47
55,921 47,403 117,409
Top Ten Sending 
Countries in 
201048
Mexico, South Africa, Peru, 
Guatemala, Romania, 
Nicaragua, New Zealand, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay
Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, 
Philippines, South Africa, U.K.,  
El Salvador, Indonesia, Honduras, 
Costa Rica
India, China, South Korea, U.K., 






Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
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L-1 B-1
Multinational corporations, including high-tech, computer, 
and information technology services-related firms (not only 
executives and managers but also lower level positions)
Multinational corporations, including high-tech, computer, and 
information technology services-related firms (ex. Infosys); 
domestic work
“[A]n alien who . . . has been employed continuously for one 
year by a firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate 
or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter the United States 
temporarily in order to continue to render his services to 
the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves 
specialized knowledge . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(L))
“[A]ny alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study 
or of performing skilled or unskilled labor or as a representative 
of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media 
coming to engage in such vocation) . . . who is visiting the United 
States temporarily for business . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(B))
74, 719
B-1 visas: 44,197 
(Note: “B-1 in lieu of H-1B” visas, “B-1 in lieu of H-3” visas, and B-1 
visas for domestic workers not disaggregated by State Department)
Combination B-1/B-2 visas: 3,278,782 
Combination B-1/B-2 visa Border Crossing Cards to Mexican 
nationals: 971,886
India, U.K., Japan, Mexico, France, China, Germany, South 
Korea, Brazil, Australia
B-1 visas (State Department): Mexico, Philippines, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Brazil, Peru, U.K., India, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador
Combination B-1/B-2 visas issued by State Department: China, 
India, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Taiwan, Russia, 
Israel, Philippines
Department of Homeland Security State Department
Visas Commonly Used for Temporary Foreign Labor
Visas H-2A H-2B H-1B
Employers/ Job 
Positions
Agricultural work, including 
tobacco farms, onion and sweet 
potato farms, and fruit picking
Amusement parks; forestry industry; 
seafood industry; landscaping; 
housekeeping and cleaning; 
groundskeeping ( indust r ia l , 
commerc ia l ) ; cons t ruc t ion ; 
restaurants
Computer programming and 
information technology services; 
a c c o u n t i n g ; e n g i n e e r i n g ; 
physicians and nurses; teachers; 
architectural drafters; cooks; law 
clerks; market research analysis; 





“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporar i ly  to the United 
States to perform agricultural 
labor or services . . . and the 
pressing of apples for cider 
on a farm, of a temporary 
or seasonal nature . . . .” 
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a))
“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporarily to the United States 
to perform other temporary 
service or labor if unemployed 
persons capable of performing 
such service or labor cannot be 
found in this country . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b))
“[A]n alien . . . who is coming 
temporarily to the United States 
to perform services [other 
than H-2A labor or services, 
among other exceptions] . . . 
in a specialty occupation . . . 
or who is coming temporarily 
to the United States to perform 
services as a registered nurse 
. . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b))
# of Visas Issued 
in 2010 by State 
Department47
55,921 47,403 117,409
Top Ten Sending 
Countries in 
201048
Mexico, South Africa, Peru, 
Guatemala, Romania, 
Nicaragua, New Zealand, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay
Mexico, Jamaica, Guatemala, 
Philippines, South Africa, U.K.,  
El Salvador, Indonesia, Honduras, 
Costa Rica
India, China, South Korea, U.K., 






Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
Department of Labor; 
Department of Homeland 
Security
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Visas Commonly Used for Temporary Foreign Labor
Visas A-3 G-5
Employers/ Job 





“[A]ttendants, servants, personal employees, and 
members of their immediate families, of [foreign 
government] officials and employees,” including 
ambassadors, public ministers, and career 
diplomatic or consular officers, with A-1 or A-2 visas.
(INA § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii))
“[A]ttendants, servants, and personal employees 
of any . . . representative, officer, or employee [of 
international organizations with G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 
visas], and the members of [their] immediate families 
. . . .” 
(INA § 101(a)(15)(G)(iv))
# of Visas Issued 
in 2010 by State 
Department48
916 747
Top Ten Sending 
Countries in 
20104
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, 
Brazil, Mexico, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Nigeria
Philippines, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, 





State Department State Department
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F-1 J-1
On-campus jobs; retail store clerks; high-skilled positions, 
including information-technology jobs
Summer Work Travel: Hotels; restaurants; amusement parks; 
beach resorts; ski resorts; seafood processing plants; factories 
and warehouses
Trainees and Interns: Hotels; restaurants; airlines; corporations; 
architectural firms; development organizations; investment and 
financial services; manufacturing companies; dairy farms
Positions/employers for other J-1 categories: camp counselors; 
au pairs; schools and educational institutions (for teachers, 
professors, scholars, students); hospitals and private practices 
(for physicians)
“[A]n alien . . . who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue 
a full course of study and who seeks to enter the United States 
temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such 
a course of study . . . at an established college, university, 
seminary, conservatory, academic high school, elementary 
school, or other academic institution or in a language training 
program . . . approved by the Attorney General . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i))
“[A]n alien . . . who is a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, 
professor, research assistant, specialist, or leader in a field of 
specialized knowledge or skill . . . who is coming temporarily to 
the United States as a participant in [an exchange visitors] 
program designated by the [Department of State], for the 
purpose of teaching, instructing or lecturing, studying, observing, 
conducting research, consulting, demonstrating special skills, or 
receiving training . . . .”
(INA § 101(a)(15)(J))
385,210 320,805
China, South Korea, India, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Japan, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Mexico, Brazil
China, Russia, Germany, U.K., France, Brazil, Ukraine, Turkey, 
South Korea, Thailand Israel, Philippines
Department of Homeland Security State Department
Visas Commonly Used for Temporary Foreign Labor
Visas A-3 G-5
Employers/ Job 





“[A]ttendants, servants, personal employees, and 
members of their immediate families, of [foreign 
government] officials and employees,” including 
ambassadors, public ministers, and career 
diplomatic or consular officers, with A-1 or A-2 visas.
(INA § 101(a)(15)(A)(iii))
“[A]ttendants, servants, and personal employees 
of any . . . representative, officer, or employee [of 
international organizations with G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 
visas], and the members of [their] immediate families 
. . . .” 
(INA § 101(a)(15)(G)(iv))
# of Visas Issued 
in 2010 by State 
Department48
916 747
Top Ten Sending 
Countries in 
20104
Philippines, Indonesia, India, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, 
Brazil, Mexico, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Nigeria
Philippines, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, India, Sri Lanka, 





State Department State Department
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U.S. Government Reforms  
Each one of the visa categories and sub-categories that constitute the temporary foreign worker system 
has generated significant debate within the U.S. government, at many different levels. Concerns about the 
abuse of foreign workers, the displacement of U.S. workers, and the potential for fraud date back virtually to 
the inception of each visa category, as documented by Congressional hearings, reports by the Government 
Accountability Office (a federal watchdog agency), and reviews of visa regulations by the governmental 
agencies responsible for oversight. 
Regulatory “quick fixes”
As currently framed, the visas are marked by many well-meaning, if sometimes haphazard, efforts to revise 
and reform them. A few examples are given below.
  A-3/ G-5 Domestic Workers: The State Department expressed concern in 1996 about diplomat employers 
in the U.S. withholding wages, confiscating passports, imprisoning workers, and worse.49  In 2008, the 
Government Accountability Office detailed further abuses.50  The State Department’s 2010 report on human 
trafficking even acknowledged that the problems are essentially embedded in the skewed power dynamics 
between diplomatic employers and domestic workers, and that “the lack of legal protections – combined 
with the social isolation and a lack of personal autonomy inherent in live-in domestic service – provides 
an enabling environment for slavery.”51  The State Departments’ reforms have been focused primarily on 
the visa approval process. Consular officials are now required to interview all applicants for domestic 
worker visas, outside of the presence of the employer.52  Officials are also required to review the terms of 
the employment contract.53  No provisions have been made, however, to enable domestic workers file 
complaints about living and working conditions once they are in the U.S.
  J-1 Summer Work Travel Program: Recent scandals related to misuse of the Summer Work Travel Program 
of the J-1 cultural and educational exchange visa (described later in this report) have led the State 
Department to develop a number of changes to the regulations. These changes, as set forth in an Interim 
Final Rule published on 11 May 2012, include important protections for foreign student-workers (including 
bans on job placements in manufacturing and other potentially hazardous industries;54) as well as for U.S. 
workers at risk of being displaced (including a prohibition on J-1 placements in the wake of layoffs or labor 
disputes)55  At the same time, the State Department has delegated still more responsibility for enforcement 
and interpretation to private intermediaries – the J-1 sponsors – and has further reduced its direct regula-
tion of employers.56  Notably, these changes arrive more than two decades after the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office concluded in a 1990 report that the U.S. government’s “management oversight of 
the J-1 visa program has not been adequate to ensure the integrity of the program.”57  Furthermore, the 
49 U.S. State Department, Circular Diplomatic Note, May 20, 1996, at 5, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/32298.pdf.
50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government’s Efforts To Address Alleged Abuse Of Household Workers By Foreign Diplomats with Immunity Could Be Strengthened, 29 July 
2008, p.17.
51 U.S. State Department, 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report, p.32.
52 U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 41.21 N6.5-2(b).
53 U.S. State Department, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM 41.22 N4.2 and N4.4.
54 Federal Register, 77 FR 27610, referencing CFR §62.32(h)(16).
55 Federal Register, 77 FR 27611, referencing (n)(3)(iii).
56 “Acknowledging the Department does not have jurisdiction over host employers, the ‘host employer obligation’ section is renamed ‘host employer cooperation’ and refocused to urge 
sponsors to work only with host employers willing to make good faith efforts to comply with the requirements therein.”Federal Register, 77 FR 27594.
57 U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Information Agency: Inappropriate Uses of Educational and Cultural Exchange Visas, 1990. p.3.
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reforms will only affect one program of the larger J-1 visa scheme, leaving other programs with extremely 
similar weaknesses unaltered.
  L-1 Intracompany Transferees: A report issued in 2000 by the Government Accountability Office pointed to 
substantial evidence of fraud in the use of these visas, and quoted managers from the agency then known 
as Immigration and Naturalization Services, referring to the L-1 as “the new wave in alien smuggling.”58  In 
particular, the problem of multinational employers serving as “body shops” (mentioned above), which 
contract out their L-1 employees to U.S. companies in “labor for hire” deals, caused so much concern 
that Congress passed the L-1 Visa Reform Act in 2004 to try to end the practice.59  The efforts to end “body 
shops” have not been very successful, given numerous loopholes that continue to allow offsite work for 
L-1 visa holders, and payment by third parties. The Office of the Inspector General at the Department of 
Homeland Security issued a report in 2006 identifying continuing problems with the L-1 visa,60  but, as a 
2011 letter by Senator Charles Grassley pointed out, the recommendations in that report have still not 
been adequately addressed.61
Other examples include the R-1 “religious worker” visa program, where an internal review by U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services in 2007 determined that as many as one in three R-1 visas issued to “religious 
workers” were fraudulent. It is also worth noting the recent efforts of the Department of Labor to address 
abuses of low-wage H-2 workers, only to have their efforts blocked or diluted through litigation and lobbying 
by employers’ associations.
There are many more instances of problems identified 
by a range of governmental actors with different visa 
categories and the subsequent efforts made to analyze 
and amend the underlying regulations. Meaningful 
change has typically been elusive, as the examples 
suggest, either because the reform efforts are stymied 
by employers’ organizations, or because employers 
are able to shift without great difficulty to reliance on a 
different visa category. The point would appear to be 
clear: the weaknesses are not simply contained within 
individual visa categories, but cut across the entire 
temporary worker visa framework. Review and revision of 
the temporary foreign work system in the U.S. will have to 
be comprehensive, if it is to be significant. 
Uncoordinated and inefficient oversight
The descriptions above indicate how responsibility for oversight of the temporary worker visas is scattered 
among multiple government agencies. The H-2 visa, which is arguably the most carefully regulated, is a 
compelling example of the confusion that can result from diffused responsibility compounded by imperfect 
coordination. As detailed below, even the most basic data is never reconciled or consolidated.
The Department of Labor plays two distinct roles in the H-2 visa:
  In the first place, its Office of Foreign Labor Certification receives petitions from employers seeking to hire 
H-2 workers. The Office decides whether to approve them, based on an assessment of whether there is a 
risk of displacing U.S. workers.  According to data released by the Department of Labor, in 2010 it certified 
petitions for 94,218 H-2A and 86,596 H-2B positions.
58 Government Accountability Office, Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, May 2000. p.12.
59 United States Code, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(F).
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, Review of Vulnerabilities and Potential Abuses of the L-1 Visa Program, 24 January 2006.
61 Office of U.S. Senator Charles Grassley, press release, Grassley Concerned  about Fraud and Abuse in L-1 Visa Program, Mar. 30, 2011, available at  
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=33437.
…the weaknesses are not simply 
contained within individual visa 
categories, but cut across the 
entire temporary worker visa 
framework. Review and revision 
of the temporary foreign work 
system in the U.S. will have 
to be comprehensive, if it is  
to be significant.
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  Subsequently, the Wage and Hour Division is responsible for enforcing employer compliance with regula-
tions protecting U.S. and foreign workers. It may issue orders for the payment of back wages, repayment of 
illegal deductions, reinstatement of wrongfully terminated workers, and compensation for any U.S. worker 
who was improperly rejected or laid off from a job.
The State Department’s main role is to approve or deny individual visa applications. It does this through U.S. 
Embassies and Consulates around the world. The State Department reported that it issued 55,921 H-2A visas, 
and 47,403 H-2B visas in 2010.
The Department of Homeland Security has several responsibilities:
  It must give final approval to employer petitions, through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, before 
employers can seek workers abroad.
  Additionally, the agency processes requests with respect to H-2 workers already in the U.S., for extensions 
of the period of their visa or, in extremely rare cases, for transfer to a different employer. 
  Customs and Border Protection is responsible for gathering and releasing data on the number of entries 
under each visa category. In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security reported 139,406 H-2A entries, 
and 69,499 H-2B entries.
The significance of the widely varying data released 
by the three agencies should not be underestimated. 
The lack of any consolidated numbers highlights 
the broader lack of cooperation among agencies 
with respect to the temporary worker system. No one 
claims to know exactly how many H-2 workers are 
currently in the U.S.
Beyond the “H” visas, the gaps in information-sharing, 
and the confusion over jurisdiction, are even more 
profound. While there are many problems regarding 
coordination where the “H” visas are concerned, at 
least the Department of Labor has an established supervisory role, to address potential abuses of foreign and 
U.S. workers. The Department of Labor is formally subordinated, in the other temporary worker visas. 
In fact, in a number of instances involving J-1 workers complaining of mistreatment, the State Department has 
actually warned the Department of Labor not to get involved. For F J-1 visa holders, the only official recourse 
for problems related to conditions of work is an office within the State Department, known as Exchange Coordi-
nation and Compliance. It was set up to monitor the functioning of all educational and cultural exchange 
programs under J-1 visas, and to analyze data, but has little capacity to handle individual complaints, let 
alone complex queries related to wages or working conditions. 
Stephen Yale-Loehr, who teaches immigration 
at Cornell Law School and has also written on 
legal history of temporary foreign labor in the U.S., 
points out that until 1940, all immigration issues 
were handled solely by the Department of Labor. 
“Labor aspects were much more integrated at 
every level,” he emphasized. Without proposing 
that today’s Department of Labor should return to bearing sole responsibility for managing any temporary 
foreign labor system, he urged that it be re-integrated into all visa categories. As further noted by Yale-Loehr, 
even if there are multiple agencies involved in oversight, there should be a system in place for clear, consistent 
cooperation among them. 
The cooperation should also extend to include U.S. engagement with worker’s home country governments, 
through mechanisms such as negotiated bilateral agreements on worker protection and the sharing of infor-
mation. For the U.S., its H-2A program with Jamaica (described in greater detail below) is the one remaining 
…until 1940, all immigration issues 
were handled solely by the Department 
of Labor, and labor aspects were much 
more integrated at every level...








H-2A 94,218 55,921 139,406
H-2B 86,596 47,403 69,499
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vestige of its bilateral arrangements on labor migration); it has not entered into others in over half a century. 
The U.S. position is far from the norm, in this respect. Each of the countries sending workers to the U.S. also sends 
workers to a number of other countries, frequently under bilateral agreements. Through interviews conducted 
for this report, it became apparent that advocates and government officials in workers’ home countries 
routinely understand the U.S. approach in the context of their experiences with other “host” countries. They 
describe the frustration of dealing with the U.S. system, which is truly anomalous in its blanket refusal to share 
information or strategy with workers’ home countries, and experience the U.S. as callous and unaccountable, 
even when confronted with evidence of gross abuses of foreign citizens on its soil.
The general lack of coordination, transparency and accountability in U.S. procedures for oversight and 
enforcement in the temporary foreign labor system is troubling. It is even more so in combination with the U.S. 
government’s problematic understanding of the relationship between employers and foreign workers as a 
purely private one, even though there are clear issues of public interest at stake – including the livelihoods 
of U.S. workers. 
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U.S Advocacy: An Uphill Battle
Civil society organizations in the U.S. have tried to highlight or challenge egregious elements of certain visas, 
and in many cases have appeared to make significant gains through their advocacy. Some of these efforts are 
outlined below. However, extensive interviews with advocates indicate the fragility of even the most impressive 
victories. As noted above, it is not hard for employers to switch from reliance on one visa where regulations 
and protections appear to be getting onerous, to another – or to switch from sourcing from one particular 
country to another.  
Snapshots of advocacy campaigns
Advocate efforts have focused heavily on the H-2 visas, and in response to this pressure, those regulations 
have improved in many important ways. But, while the advocacy stories below are inspiring – with critical 
organizing victories and litigation successes among them – in their larger context, they also serve to empha-
size the ease with which the gains can and have been taken away. In some cases, advocates themselves 
describe the changes wrought as having been insufficient to reduce the problems to any significant degree. 
  In 2007, the Southern Poverty Law Center issued Close to Slavery, a report documenting violations in the 
H-2A and H-2B programs, through the lens of litigation undertaken by legal organizations supporting 
migrant workers. The report detailed litigation that exposed and challenged abuses such as the use of 
threats and retaliation to control H-2 workers, gross violations of wage and hour laws, and systematic 
discrimination in recruitment and pay. Through such litigation, workers have received substantial awards 
for unpaid wages, and important precedents have been set, determining that routine deductions from 
workers’ wages are actually illegal.
In an interview with Mary Bauer, author of Close to Slavery, she emphasized how little has changed in the H-2 
visa context, since the publication of the report. The precedent-setting litigation has not served as a meaningful 
disincentive for employers to exploit H-2 workers, and even political change that has improved the Depart-
ment of Labor has not checked the abuse. (During the George W. Bush administration, H-2 regulations were 
eroded, and enforcement was dramatically scaled back; under the current administration, many regulatory 
protections for H-2 workers have been restored and strengthened, and there is new commitment to enforcing 
workers’ rights). “We’re heartened by the fact that the Department of Labor is doing a much better job than 
they used to, but it’s not clear that things are different for H-2 workers in the real world,” Bauer observed. “We 
continue to see the same issues playing out.” The power dynamics have become so engrained in the opera-
tion of the H-2 visas that, she reflected, “It is hard to imagine what a good temporary worker program could 
look like, and how it is not, in practice, abusive.”
  In 1999, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee called for a boycott against the Mt. Olive Pickle Company, 
focusing attention to the ways in which “name brands” at the top of the supply chain were the ones to 
benefit most from the exploitation of migrant farmworkers. The organization emphasized that brands such 
as Mt. Olive demanded impossibly low prices for the produce they sourced from farmers, who in turn were 
forced to squeeze their workers to work harder and harder for lower wages in order to make any profit at 
all. In 2004, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee ended the boycott, having succeeded in securing a 
commitment from Mt. Olive to pay higher prices to growers for its cucumbers. In addition, the organization 
signed a collective bargaining agreement with the North Carolina Growers’ Association, to represent H-2A 
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workers who travel from Mexico to work on farms in North Carolina. The North Carolina Growers’ Associa-
tion, on behalf of its members, brings in more than 8000 H-2A workers every year.
As Baldemar Velásquez, co-founder and President of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, noted in an inter-
view, the campaign helped focus public attention on the large, wealthy companies who may never directly 
employ temporary workers, but benefit directly from their labor, and help create the conditions that ensure 
their exploitation. The collective bargaining agreement secured, for these H-2A workers, a set of rights that few 
other temporary workers enjoy, such as the right to some job security, through provisions that allow workers 
to return for subsequent seasons, based on their seniority rather than favoritism on the part of the employer, 
and the right to complain about working conditions, without fearing retaliation, firing, and deportation. But, 
according to the North Carolina Growers’ Association, half of its 1,000 farmers almost immediately stopped 
using the organization’s services to bring in H-2A workers, turning to other suppliers of temporary foreign labor 
who do not have to provide the same guarantees to their workers.62  The membership of the North Carolina 
Growers’ Association remains steady today, with the help of consistent campaigning by the Farm Labor Organ-
izing Committee. However, it is a potent reminder of the fragility of any effort to address basic gaps in public 
regulation through private contract. The government makes no effort to check employers in their search for 
workers who are ever cheaper, and easier to exploit. 
  In 2006, a company in Mississippi, Signal International, brought in 500 welders and pipe fitters from India, 
on H-2B visas, to repair oil rigs damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The workers had paid up to $20,000 each 
to recruiters who had promised them “green cards” which would allow them to settle in the U.S. with their 
families as permanent residents and work wherever they chose, but instead found themselves on short-
term visas for low-wage work, trapped with one abusive employer. When workers protested the fraud as 
well as employer mistreatment, Signal International approached Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
part of the Department of Homeland Security, for advice on how to fire them and send them back to India. 
However, with the support of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice, the workers were able to 
organize to escape from the labor camp where they were being kept by Signal International, expose the 
complicity of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and demand protection as victims of a sophisticated 
cross-border trafficking scheme. 
The Signal International workers’ campaign for justice helped transform debates on temporary worker programs, 
both in India and the U.S. As noted by Jennifer Rosenbaum, legal director of the National Guestworker Alliance, 
the Signal campaign highlighted the imperative of organizing partnerships between the U.S. and workers’ home 
countries to end worker abuse and visa misuse, and catalyzed a support network of labor and community 
organizers, trade unions and progressive lawyers from India as well as the U.S. However, in the wake of the 
scandal, and without any apparent consultation, the Department of Homeland Security moved to develop 
a list of countries eligible to participate in the H2 program – “and India was not on that list,” said Rosenbaum. 
The action taken by the Department of Homeland Security not only punished other Indian workers, by denying 
them job opportunities in the U.S., but it also undermined a cross-border organizing network that could have 
ensured that H-2 workers along this particular migration path were actually less vulnerable. 
  In 2010, the International Human Rights Clinic at American University Washington College of Law and the 
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante released Picked Apart, a report on H-2B women workers employed 
by Maryland’s crab industry. The findings strongly supported arguments that the U.S. Department of Labor 
should strengthen protections for H-2B workers. The report found, for example, that even though Mexican 
and U.S. law prohibit recruiters from charging fees to workers seeking a job, “100% of women who reported 
working with a recruiter paid that recruiter a fee,” and most women took on loans to pay these fees.63  
The work environment was very stressful, since workers were paid for every pound of crabmeat they were 
able to pick, and earnings in general were low, with additional deductions for such things as protective 
equipment and tools.64
At the current moment, the H-2B regulatory reforms that were ultimately developed by the Department of 
Labor and scheduled to go into effect in April 2012 have been stalled by legal challenges from employers, as 
well as concerted opposition from members of Congress, including some acting explicitly in defense of the 
Maryland crab industry. Even elected leaders whose voting records reflect consistent support for U.S. workers 
62 Rural Migration News, Vol. 12 Number 2, April 2006, available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1107_0_3_0.
63 American University Washington College of Law (International Human Rights Law Clinic) and Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Picked Apart: The Hidden Struggles of  Migrant 
Worker Women in the Maryland Crab Industry (2010) p.14.
64 Picked Apart, p.26.
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have spoken out against the new H-2B regulations, insisting that higher wages and enhanced enforcement 
will be too much of a burden on employers. “Temporary workers can’t vote, they are isolated and don’t tend to 
have a substantial community that will vote in their name, and so they have no voice in the political process,” 
was how one government staff person, who chose not to be identified, described the dynamic at work. Jayesh 
Rathod, a professor at the Washington College of Law who was involved in Picked Apart, emphasized in an 
interview that elected leaders kept pressing certain sets of arguments when the advocates associated with 
the report met with them to discuss its implications. “Even in face-to-face meetings, they defend the program 
as it stands, talking about the risks of foreign competition, the cost to small businesses of any change, and 
the unreliability of the U.S. workforce,” he described. “There is lots of sympathy for mistreated workers, but there 
is reluctance to change the basic architecture of the program.”
These textured advocacy efforts have exposed many of the weaknesses in the H-2 visas, but the dynamics of 
exploitation have proven to be deeply embedded. The obstacles to meaningful, enduring change in the H-2 
context are certainly mirrored in the other visas. But the peculiar composite structure of the system presents 
yet another problem, as discussed below. Advocates seeking to draw attention to abuses under one particular 
visa category have found that employers will temporarily shift to using a different visa to bring in workers, until 
the scandal – and heightened scrutiny – have passed.
Shifting among visas, but the abuses remain constant
The shortcomings of the H-2 program have been in the public eye, to some extent, and the Department of 
Labor’s involvement has allowed for some avenues of complaint. The flaws in other temporary work visas – which, 
as previously noted, bring in over 500,000 workers – remain relatively unreported, even though the abuses 
workers face are similar or worse. As Jennifer Rosenbaum described it, “Practically speaking, the reality for H-2, 
H-1B and J-1 workers is essentially the same. Employers try to pass on as many of the costs as possible to these 
workers – visa fees, transportation, housing. When they protest, they are forced to attend captive audience 
meetings where they are threatened with termination and deportation.” In the case of each of these tempo-
rary worker visas, as Rosenbaum added, employers and recruiters also routinely threaten temporary foreign 
workers with long-term immigration consequences, suggesting that they will face not only deportation, but 
permanent exclusion from the U.S., if they complain about abusive treatment.
One of the reasons that there has been little 
net improvement in the U.S. temporary foreign 
labor system, in spite of advocacy efforts, is 
that the visas are essentially interchangeable, 
and employers are able to shift easily from 
reliance on one category to another. 
In some cases, employers will do so because 
visas of a particular category are no longer 
available. As mentioned in the summary 
above, the H-2B and the H-1B visas both have 
“caps,” imposing an upper limit on how many people can come in to the U.S. every year to perform particular 
types of work. However, from the perspective of advocates interviewed, this has simply meant that employers 
have moved to other visa categories to meet their needs:
  As Mary Bauer of the Southern Poverty Law Center described in an interview, “whenever the hospitality 
industry in the Gulf Coast hits the H-2B cap, the number of J-1 workers balloons.”
  The Department of Education in New York City has turned to the J-1 program to bring in foreign teachers, 
when there were no more H-1B visas available in a particular year.65 
  Rachel Micah-Jones of the Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, which has been researching worker 
abuses in the carnival and fair industry, mentioned that employers have been using visas as obscure as 
the O-1 (intended for foreigners of “extraordinary ability” or “extraordinary achievement”) and the P-3 (for 
65 Interview with Ana Avendaño, AFL-CIO.
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artists and entertainers involved in a “culturally unique program”) to skirt the H-2B visas, and fill low-wage 
jobs setting up tents and operating rides.  
If the anecdotal evidence is borne out, this would suggest that the policy of capping visas, premised on 
addressing a defined labor shortage in a particular industry, is largely meaningless.
Advocates have also alleged that employers have switched the visa categories they relied on, either because 
they found the regulations in the “H” visa process too onerous or expensive, or because they sought a tempo-
rary respite from litigation or public controversy:  
  In one example, emerging from a case filed by a U.S. employee of the multinational Infosys, the giant 
corporation was not only using B-1 “in lieu of” H-3 visas (rather than H-1B visas) to bring in large numbers 
of skilled workers, but was paying them a “stipend” of $15,000 a year, rather than the prevailing wage of 
$65,000 that would have been required under H-1B rules.66
  Greg Schell of Florida Legal Services noted in an interview that many hotels in Florida had shifted from 
reliance on H-2B to using J-1 “intern” visas, when confronted with litigation demanding that they pay the 
transportation costs of H-2B workers, to and from the U.S. “So now there are Filipino hotel management 
degree candidates making beds in Palm Beach at minimum wage,” said Schell. 
Such stories amount, in the aggregate, to a condemnation of the system as it stands, and a call for compre-
hensive legislative and regulatory overhaul. There is a clear imperative to look beyond the individual visa 
categories and the apparent distinctness of their purpose, to understand the core employer interests and 
the disempowerment of workers that connect them all.
66 Palmer v. Infosys Technologies Ltd., Complaint, No. CV-2011-900228, 23 February 2011.
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U.S. Workers Need Not Apply 
Those with a passing familiarity with the U.S. temporary foreign labor system would be likely to assume that 
these workers fill significant gaps in the labor market, where there are no “qualified, willing and available” U.S. 
workers. This assumption deserves to be interrogated, for two different reasons. First, for the visas that do require 
some determination of a shortage of U.S. workers, the enforcement mechanisms are relatively narrow and 
weak, as indicated below, and easy to evade. Second, for other visas, employers do not even have to pretend 
to seek U.S. workers first.
Bypassing U.S. workers
Given the procedures and delays associated with 
seeking foreign workers, it would seem inexplicable that 
U.S. employers look beyond the U.S. unless absolutely 
necessary. However, there are many incentives for 
employers to recruit overseas. Most importantly, tempo-
rary foreign workers are substantially cheaper than 
U.S. workers as a general matter. Furthermore, since 
it is difficult to apply U.S. anti-discrimination law to 
recruitment actions overseas, employers can pick out 
the “perfect worker” – in many circumstances, young, 
male, and with no family obligations – without fearing 
a lawsuit. Finally, given the mechanisms of employer 
control enabled by these visas, foreign workers are 
structurally easier to exploit than most U.S. workers. In 
light of these inducements, it is necessary to look more 
closely at claims that temporary foreign workers are 
brought in only in the context of labor shortages. 
The story is perhaps most surprising in certain agricultural 
labor contexts. As journalist Dan Rather has described 
it, “Even among those skeptical of the general concept 
of ‘jobs Americans won’t do,’ when it comes to farm 
work, foreign labor [has] long been the historical reality 
and the conventional wisdom.” The article goes on 
to describe a visit to Colquitt County, Georgia, where 
Rather “found plenty of out-of-work Americans – liter-
ally hundreds – vying for jobs in the fields.”67  Legal 
Services lawyers describe in detail the various means 
by which employers are able to discriminate against 
these American workers, even though the regulations 
are framed to protect them from being displaced or 
replaced. 
67 Dan Rather, “Help Not Wanted?” Huffington Post, 13 October 2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dan-rather/help-not-wanted_b_761132.html..
Unauthorized Workers: comparing structures  
of exploitation
In many surprising respects, temporary foreign workers are even 
more vulnerable than unauthorized workers since, as some 
advocates have noted, they are actually under greater employer 
control: Unauthorized workers work and live under extremely 
difficult conditions, but they do have the ability to quit their jobs 
without the lawful requirement that the employer immediately 
report them to the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, there 
are real disincentives for employers of unauthorized workers 
to expose their own noncompliance with the law by doing so.  
 
Another problem relates to Department of Labor oversight. 
There is substantial clarity, among governmental agencies, 
that the Department of Labor can and will step in to address 
claims related to unpaid wages or mistreatment raised by 
unauthorized workers, or by workers coming in under the “H” 
visas. However, as noted above, Department of Labor juris-
diction over abuses related to visas supervised entirely by 
the State Department, and/or the Department of Homeland 
Security , is either highly contested or absent. Half a dozen 
U.S. advocates described instances where Department of 
Labor officials had been told by officials of other agencies to 
be “hands off” on certain cases of clear abuse, involving J-1 
students, A-3 domestic workers, and “B-1 in lieu of H-3” trainees. 
 
There are also numerous credible accounts that workers 
on temporary visas earn even less than similarly-situated 
unauthorized workers. Julián Adem Díaz de León, director of 
the protection of Mexican citizens abroad at Mexico’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, agreed that this was broadly true, based on 
his own experience with Mexicans involved in low-wage work 
in the U.S. This was echoed by advocates who had compared 
the earnings of unauthorized workers and foreign workers on 
visas, in agriculture in the Napa Valley, construction work in New 
York State, and housekeeping work in resorts in South Carolina.
U.S. Workers Need Not Apply  | 37
“There is an absolute displacement of U.S. workers in southern California, around the border,” said Cynthia 
Rice, an attorney at California Rural Legal Assistance, in an interview. “There is up to 24% unemployment in 
the Imperial Valley, and yet employers are bringing in 400 to 500 broccoli harvesters.” One of the many strate-
gies employed has been to shift the purported job location from Calexico, California – where it has always 
been, and where many unemployed American farmworkers live – to Yuma, Arizona, more than 60 miles away. 
“We are trying to challenge this right now,” said Rice, “but the Department of Labor will only look at the issue 
narrowly, to see whether there are U.S. workers who have been refused work, rather than seeing the structural 
discrimination.” She also described how employers manipulate the requirement that jobs be advertised to 
American farmworkers first: “They will send in a job description to the unemployment office – but that’s just not 
how farmworkers are hired! The practice has always been to post vacancies at the work site. So if the unemploy-
ment office is the pool of who you’re looking to for willing and available farmworkers, then there’s a problem.”
Rebecca Miller, staff attorney at the Farmworker Rights Division of Georgia Legal Services (which handled the 
Colquitt County case described by Dan Rather) described how employers manage to get rid of existing U.S. 
workers, in order to replace them with temporary foreign workers. “The employers start a campaign of wearing 
the U.S. workers down, by making the job more burdensome and offering them less hours, to encourage people 
to quit.” The organization recently won a determination from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(the governmental agency tasked with enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws) regarding exactly such a 
campaign of discrimination against American workers. The agency noted that Hamilton Growers “engages in 
a pattern or practice of regularly denying work hours and assigning less favorable assignments to U.S. workers, 
in favor of H-2A guestworkers,” and “discharging U.S. workers and replacing them with H-2A guestworkers.”68
Similar discrimination is rife where employers are seeking low-wage workers outside the agricultural context, 
through the H-2B visa, which also requires that the jobs be offered to American workers first. In comments 
submitted to the Department of Labor in support of efforts to strengthen H-2B regulations, the National Employ-
ment Law Project chronicled systematic “bogus advertisements in media designed to avoid U.S. workers, 
through unreasonable job qualifications, or through simple lack of follow up with qualified U.S. workers.” The 
organization went on to describe:
“One media investigation reported that an East Coast visa fraud conspiracy simply scheduled interviews 
with U.S. applicants for inconvenient times, such as 6 p.m. on Christmas Eve. The few Americans who 
actually appeared reported later that the interviewers were ‘intimidating’ and made the jobs sound ‘as 
bad as possible.’”69
In an interview, Christopher Willett of the Equal Justice Center cited several instances where “employers adver-
tise a job in terms that ensure no U.S. worker will want it – and then when the foreign workers show up, you find 
out that it’s a higher quality job, at a better wage.” A U.S. government official detailed several cases, including 
of foreign landscaping supervisors on H-2B visas being paid $18 an hour for jobs advertised to Americans 
as entry-level jobs, at an hourly rate of $8. “The actual hourly wage, in a fair market, would have been $25. 
Everyone loses... except the employer,” the official concluded. 
As this comment implies, the impact of such discrimination goes well beyond the individual American workers 
denied jobs. Economists and trade unions, among others, have sounded the alarm about eroded working 
conditions and depressed wages in low-wage and professional sectors where U.S. employers have brought 
in large numbers of workers on “H” visas.70
Total exclusion of U.S. workers
Beyond the “H” system, there is no obligation imposed on employers to look for U.S. workers at all, creating still 
greater scope for discrimination. Furthermore, the economic incentives for employers to look beyond the U.S. 
are even greater.. First, as noted, there is no requirement to pay foreign workers the prevailing wages. Second, 
68 Jeremy Redmon, “Feds: South Georgia farm favors foreign laborers over U.S. workers,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 5 August 2011.
69 National Employment Law Project, “Comments on RIN 1205-AB58, Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States” 17 May 2011, available at http://www.
nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2011/CommentsonProposedRulesTemporaryEmployment.pdf?nocdn=1. .
70 See e.g. Ray Marshall, Immigration for Shared Prosperity: A Framework for Comprehensive Reform, Economic Policy Institute, 2009.
38 | Visas, Inc: Corporate Control and Policy Incoherence in the U.S. Temporary Foreign Labor System
there are numerous exemptions from employment taxes under many visa categories, leading to savings of 
up to 11.5% of payroll, according to one U.S.- based recruitment agency that asked not to be identified. The 
examples of displacement and replacement of U.S. workers, as documented by trade unions, journalists and 
lawyers, cut across the spectrum of visa categories:
  Stories abound of large multinational corporations – including Pfizer, Siemens, Nielsen, Wachovia, and 
Bank of America – replacing U.S. workers with foreign workers, relying on the L-1 “intra-company transfer” 
visa to bring in employees from their operations abroad. U.S. employees have even been required to train 
the foreign employees who were brought to the U.S. to take over their jobs.71
  In an interview for this report, Ana Avendaño, Associate General Counsel and Director of the Immigrant 
Worker Program at the AFL-CIO, pointed to misuse of the E-2 visa, which allows foreign investors to bring 
workers with “special skills” from their home countries. She described one investor in Florida who brought 
in his own sheet metal workers – in spite of the fact that there were many highly skilled Americans, repre-
sented by unions in the metal trades, out of work. In this case, a number of U.S. workers showed up at the 
work site to protest and demand the jobs.
  Employers have even been able to use these other visa categories to bring foreign workers into sectors 
where they are currently not permitted, under Department of Labor regulations intended to protect American 
workers’ interests. For example, the dairy industry is currently excluded from the H-2A program but, as 
Christopher Willett from the Equal Justice Center noted, employers have already found a way around this 
restriction. An organization named Global Cow offers to send American dairy farmers foreign “interns” and 
“trainees,” on J-1 visas. According to the organization’s own website, the foreign workers’ wages are as low 
as $6.55 per hour; they can be required to work for up to 55 hours per week, with no overtime compensa-
tion. Global Cow deducts $380 to $580 per month from workers’ wages, including for an enforced “savings” 
program; the worker forfeits these “savings” if he or she tries to leave the program early.72
The purported justification for the J-1 and Q visas – cultural exchange – has rendered them peculiarly immune 
to challenges from U.S. workers on the grounds of national origin discrimination. As documented in an extensive 
analysis of the Q visa by Kit Johnson, a law professor at the University of North Dakota, an American employee 
of Disney had tried to challenge the practice of staffing much of the resort with only foreign workers, but failed 
at the level of the District Court as well as the 11th Circuit. The courts accepted the idea that Disney was 
entitled to prioritize hiring foreign workers, to promote an environment of “cultural authenticity.”73
Challenging discrimination against U.S. workers
The system is designed to pit U.S. workers and temporary foreign workers against each other. With no expert, 
independent assessment of genuine labor shortages, it is easy for U.S. workers to succumb to a generic fear 
that foreign workers are “stealing” their jobs, and for foreign workers to believe that U.S. workers are trying 
to protect jobs that they themselves are unwilling to perform. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to forge 
solidarity among U.S. and foreign workers on the many workplace issues they may hold in common – wage 
theft, occupational safety, retaliation against those who try to organize. 
Many advocates – especially farmworker lawyers – have urged that the issue of unfair competition between 
H-2A workers and U.S. farmworkers has to be confronted directly. Even though it is sometimes a difficult 
balancing act for organizations working with both U.S. and H-2A workers, advocates pointed out that most 
foreign workers understood that failure to challenge unfair competition ultimately only served employers. 
Strategies of doing so varied, with Cynthia Rice describing her organization, California Rural Legal Assistance, 
taking a particularly proactive approach, consistently reviewing all “job orders” approving growers’ requests 
for H-2A workers, and distributing leaflets to local communities to inform them of the availability of these jobs, 
to ensure that American workers have a fair opportunity to apply. California Rural Legal Assistance also repre-
sents U.S. workers who have gone through the process of applying for a job and have been rejected, as well 
as U.S. workers claiming wrongful discharge. 
71 Ron Hira, The H-1B and L-1 Visa Programs: Out of Control, p.5; Steven Greenhouse, The Big Squeeze: Tough Times for the American Worker, Alfred A. Knopf 2008, pp.207-08; Michael Kruse 
and Theresa Blackwell, “How Oldsmar got Global Influence,” St. Petersburg Times, 21 September 2008; and Lee Howard, “Pfizer to Ax IT Contractors?” The Day, 3 November 2008.
72 Website of The Global Cow, Ltd., http://www.globalcow.com/images/pdfs/global-cow-monetary-information.pdf. .
73 Kit Johnson, “The Wonderful World of Disney Visas,” (citing Gupta v. Walt Disney World Co., 256 F. App’x 279, 280 (11th Cir. 2007)).
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As Jayesh Rathod of the Washington College of Law noted, from the perspective of his work on the Picked Apart 
report, the standard for allowing temporary foreign workers in a given industry, in a given location – requiring 
that employers demonstrate the absence of qualified, willing and available U.S. workers – is clearly a legitimate 
one, worth defending and applying fairly. The economic displacement of U.S. workers in the Maryland crab 
industry took place more than two decades ago, and is now far too entrenched to reverse easily. However, 
as he noted, it remains critically important to be able to convey to policymakers that the genuine labor 
shortage of today was carefully crafted. It reflects a conscious choice on the part of crab industry employers 
to abandon a permanent, unionized workforce of Americans, rather than a natural shift within labor markets. 
It is imperative that examples such as this be at the forefront of advocacy, emphasizing the need for effective 
regulations that can guide and limit what employers are allowed to do, in terms of reshaping work in the U.S. 
Employers should not be entitled to erode wages and conditions for their U.S. workers until they leave, in order 
to create a “labor shortage” that can then be filled by a foreign workforce.
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The Abuse and Exploitation 
of Foreign Workers
It is difficult to disaggregate the complex narratives of temporary foreign workers in the U.S. into discrete 
moments of violations and problems. The fraud, underpayment, harassment and control documented below 
are of course embedded within larger tales of life choices in home countries, and migrants’ expectations of 
the U.S., which can not be easily reduced to purely economic or rational desires. So, while this section focuses 
on U.S. advocates’ perspectives, and a framework of U.S. law and policy, it places these accounts in dialog 
with advocates from workers’ home countries, whose viewpoints may offer additional nuance and context 
on how we think about the violations, as well as potential remedies. 
 
In reading the points made below, it would be worth bearing in mind the sheer scale and ubiquity of this 
workforce: at least 700,000 workers at any given time, traveling to every state in the U.S. They are here as 
agricultural workers, hotel workers, domestic workers, teachers, nurses, and more. Their exploitation cannot be 
considered accidental, or anecdotal, or exceptional – in many ways, it is structural. Given the economic incen-
tives in play, and the fact that even well-intentioned employers are forced to participate in this “race to the 
bottom,” it is hard to escape the reality: foreign workers 
who can legally be paid less than U.S. workers will be 
paid less. If employers are free to discriminate, they will 
seek out young male farmworkers, and avoid hiring 
older women. If foreign workers are denied access 
to meaningful avenues of redress, the atmosphere 
of general impunity will mean routine exploitation of 
these workers.
Abuses by recruiters and other 
intermediaries
With respect to temporary work visas, the basic respon-
sibility of employers for the treatment of employees is 
complicated and diffused by the increasing presence 
of a range of “middlemen.” These include recruiters 
outside the U.S., as well as possible labor contractors, 
sub-contractors and outsourcing facilities within the 
U.S. – each benefiting, in particular ways, from the very 
lucrative and largely unregulated business of foreign 
labor.
It has often proved difficult to hold employers account-
able for mistreatment of workers, in a number of 
cases, across visa categories – intermediaries have 
A “perfect storm” of structural factors make workers 
easy to exploit:
•	 Bound	to	their	employer. Temporary workers’ visa status is tied 
to the employer who sponsored them, creating an artificial 
marketplace for their labor. These workers cannot respond 
to mistreatment by leaving and looking elsewhere for fair 
conditions.
•	 Social	isolation. Temporary foreign workers tend to be isolated 
– usually far from their families and support systems, living in 
housing provided by the employer and thus at the employer’s 
disposal.
•	Minimal	access	to	justice	in	the	U.S. It is not easy to raise 
claims even while workers are still in the U.S. – quite besides 
workers’ fear of retaliation if they complain. The vast majority of 
temporary foreign workers have no access to federally-funded 
legal services; enforcement by the Department of Labor is 
either absent or inadequate; and often workers do not have 
the right to bring their employer to court to enforce themselves 
the minimum protections laid out in the visa regulations.
•	No	“portable	justice.” Workers who return to their home 
countries have few clear avenues to pursue claims against 
U.S. employers. For employers, sending workers back to their 
home countries is an easy way to silence them. 
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contributed to the abuses in contexts ranging from giant corporations requiring large numbers of high-tech 
workers, to foreign diplomats seeking a single domestic worker.
With respect to the J-1 Exchange Visitor visas, the regulations require employers and workers to work through 
an intermediary. The J-1 “sponsor” is technically an organization with a mission of promoting cross-cultural 
engagement and international educational opportunities. But, as a report by the Economic Policy Institute 
notes, many of these organizations are for-profit corporations, with some sponsors generating more than $7 
million a year in fees from workers and employers.74  Another organization has estimated that the sponsor 
industry in the Summer Work Travel category, the largest category in the broader J-1 program, is worth $100 
million.75  In addition, as mentioned in a recent report by the American Federation of Teachers, the visas of 
some J-1 teachers have been tied to the sponsor agency – meaning that the agency has as much power to 
fire the teacher and terminate his or her visa status as does the actual employer.76
In interviews conducted in China with students who had traveled to the U.S. on J-1 “summer work travel” visas, 
they all described a thick web of intermediaries. They had signed two contracts (one in China, and another 
with substantially poorer terms of employment once in the U.S.), they had two visa sponsors, and some, at 
various times, took orders from up to three different companies at the same time. A major complaint, for those 
who were most unhappy with their experience in the U.S., was that that it was hard to know who to blame for 
oppressive working conditions, high levels of surveillance and control, and heavy deductions for housing costs. 
As the brief description of the F-1 student visa indicates, universities and colleges can also play a complex 
mediating role in facilitating – and even financially benefiting from – student work. At the most basic level, 
as noted in the Chronicle of Higher Education, even unaccredited institutions “generate millions of dollars in 
profits because they have the power, bestowed by the U.S. government, to help students get visas.”77  One such 
unaccredited university based in California, Tri-Valley, charged tuition fees, did not require class attendance, 
and placed its F-1 “students” in low-wage retail jobs scattered around the country.78  Just 53 of the school’s 
1,555 students lived within commuting distance of the university. Following investigations and legal action by 
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security in 2011, about 1,000 F-1 students at 
Tri-Valley had to leave the country, scramble to transfer schools or face the prospect of deportation.79
Other universities may benefit from F-1 students in an even more extreme but legal manner. Immanuel Ness, 
a political scientist at Brooklyn College who has researched and written extensively on temporary workers, 
spoke about a hospitality management professor he interviewed, who described his F-1 and J-1 students 
from Jamaica as a “windfall.” Under the terms of the visa, the hospitality management school was permitted 
to send them out on practical training “internships” at a range of nearby resorts as well as at training facilities 
directly operated by the school, where they would clean and care for the facilities, with a substantial cut of 
the money they earned going back to the school.
Recruiters
It is hard to come up with a single, precise definition of a “recruiter,” because so many different entities can play 
the role of helping workers secure access to a job in the U.S. Recruiters might be large, registered firms, or a 
single individual, such as the favored employee of a U.S. landscaping firm who is asked to “bring some friends” 
when he returns the following season. In Mexico, even municipalities typically charge fees for facilitating work 
opportunities in the U.S. There are some outposts of U.S. staffing agencies based in workers’ home countries, 
engaging in recruitment as well. Even where U.S. employers have been deeply involved in recruitment, and in 
abuses related to recruitment, it has been hard to hold them responsible, as described in greater detail below. 
  Discrimination in recruitment. A wide range of federal laws in the U.S. prohibit discrimination in hiring on 
a number of important grounds, including race, color, religion, sex, and age. Advocates note, however, 
74 Daniel Costa, Guestworker Diplomacy: J visas receive minimal oversight despite significant implications for the U.S. labor market, p.37.
75 Jerry Kammer, “Cheap Labor as Cultural Exchange,” Center for Immigration Studies, December 2011.
76 American Federation of Teachers, Importing Educators: Causes and Consequences of International Teacher Recruitment, 2009. p.18.
77 Beth McMurtrie, “Foreign students pour back into the U.S.,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 21 November 2008.
78 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Student and Exchange Visitor Program Notice of Intent to Withdraw,” 19 January 2011, available at 
http://www.laborimmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Tri-Valley-University-Notice-of-Intent.pdf
79 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Attention Former Tri-Valley University Students,” 8 February 2011, available at   
http://www.ice.gov/sevis/tri-valley-110118.htm.
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that discrimination on the basis of age and gender is pervasive in the context of the temporary worker 
visas, particularly the H-2, where employers strongly prefer young, male workers, in the majority of cases. 
The discrimination endures, in spite of the U.S. government’s stated commitments to equality in employ-
ment. Advocates have found it difficult to hold U.S. employers responsible in the U.S., even where they 
were able to present evidence that the discrimination represented the employer’s preferences, and not 
just the recruiter’s. 
•	 Analysis	of	State	Department	data	on	visa	issuances,	conducted	by	the	Global	Workers	Justice	Alliance	
and available on the organization’s website, reveals that women accounted for a mere 3.7% of H-2A 
visas issued in 2010.80  While it is impossible to know how many women in general were seeking H-2A 
jobs, it is worth noting that women represent 40% of the pool of job-seekers represented by the Centro 
Independiente de Trabajadores Agricolas, a nonprofit organization involved in recruitment from Mexico. 
However, as the executive director, Janine Duron, noted in an interview, more than 90% of those selected 
from this pool by employers are men.
•	 A	State	Department	official	who	chose	not	to	be	identified	said	flatly	that	recruiters	will	choose	women	
for H-2 work only for a narrow set of jobs: picking fruit under an H-2A visa, or crab-picking under the 
H-2B visa. 
•	 Cynthia	Rice	of	California	Rural	Legal	Assistance	pointed	to	signs	of	rampant	age	discrimination	in	
recruitment – “If you look at Imperial County, there is no one brought in over 30” – but added that, in 
spite of the clear indications of discrimination, a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission had proven useless. 
•	 Baldemar	Velásquez	of	the	Farm	Labor	Organizing	Committee	recalled	that	the	organization	had	
filed a case in the early 2000s on age discrimination in H-2A recruitment for growers in North Carolina. 
However, the 4th Circuit had determined that it was not actionable under applicable U.S. law since 
the discrimination against older workers took place outside the U.S.81
  Recruiter fraud and misrepresentation. As Cathleen Caron of Global Workers Justice Alliance pointed out in 
a recent paper, current visa regulations do not enable potential workers in their home countries to deter-
mine whether a recruiter is actually representing an employer with a genuine H-2 job available. This means 
that they are taking a substantial risk in this process: that they will not be paid what the recruiter promised, 
that the job is substantially different from what was promised, or that there is no job at all. “If they gamble 
incorrectly, the result can be financial ruin or even worse, human trafficking,” Caron emphasized.82  In the 
absence of requirements in U.S. visa regulations that employers disclose the recruiters with whom they are 
working, and take responsibility for any abuses by these recruiters, there can be no accountability. Cases 
described by other advocates confirm this analysis, across multiple categories of temporary work visas.  
•	 “We	see	constant	misrepresentations	to	workers	at	the	time	of	recruitment,	about	the	hours	of	work	
available, or the wages and working conditions,” said Cynthia Rice of California Rural Legal Assistance. 
“Recruiters will tell workers they can make $600-700 a week – but then they end up with just 30 hours of 
work a week, at $10 an hour, so right away there is a violation of their expectations.” There is nothing 
that workers can do to force employers to make good on these promises, however, because it is the 
employer’s promise to the U.S. government – rather than to the foreign workers – which is considered 
the benchmark.
•	 Rebecca	Miller	of	Georgia	Legal	Services	described	the	frequency	with	which	they	encounter	complaints	
from workers that recruiters promise nonexistent jobs, and take a substantial fee. “It happens all the 
time,” she commented, “But there is not much we can do about it, since it happened in another country, 
and there was no real job order or a real employer to try to hold responsible.”
•	 Fraud	over	the	type of job is also common. Bridgette Carr, who directs the Human Trafficking Clinic at 
the University of Michigan Law School, described one particularly extreme case, where J-1 “summer 
work travel” students from the Ukraine were forced to work in a strip club in metropolitan Detroit; the 
J-1 sponsor agency had told them that they would be waiting tables at a restaurant in Virginia Beach. 
In another case, Filipino workers on H-2B visas were promised work in hotels in Missouri, but were put 
to work on farms in Louisiana. According to Carmelita Dimzon, head of the Overseas Workers Welfare 
80 Website of Global Workers Justice Alliance, Data on U.S. Migration, available at http://www.globalworkers.org/migrationdata_US_more.html#DOS.
81 Reyes-Gaona v. NCGA, 250 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 2001), cited in Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States, 2007. p.34.
82 Cathleen Caron, “Why Transparency in the Recruiter Supply Chain is Important in the Effort to Reduce Exploitation of H-2 Workers: A Global Workers Justice Alliance Position Paper,” 
September 2011. p.1.
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Administration of the Philippines government, the workers were paid “one or two dollars an hour,” clearing 
brush. 
  Recruiter fees. As many advocates said, recruiters’ 
demands that workers pay a fee in exchange for a job 
opportunity in the U.S. are virtually universal. The means 
by which recruiters extract the fee, the amount, or the 
degree to which it placed workers in situations of debt 
bondage do vary to some extent. 
•	 As	Erik	Nicholson	of	the	United	Farm	Workers	recounted	
in an interview, recruiter fees have skyrocketed in recent years. “In the early ‘90s, no one had heard 
of fees of more than $50,” he said. “Now we routinely hear of amounts like $4000, or $20,000. Sending 
countries are refusing to regulate, so workers arrive with massive debts.”
•	 Recruiters	continue	to	demand	fees,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	under	recent	changes	to	H-2A	regulations,	
they are no longer permitted to do so. According to a State Department report, “recruiters adjusted 
their practices by charging fees after the workers had obtained their visas and levying charges under 
the guise of ‘service fees.’”83
•	 With	few	exceptions,	it	remains	difficult	to	recover	these	fees	from	the	employer.	According	to	Jim	
Knoepp of the Southern Poverty Law Center, employers will insist that the recruiters had been instructed 
not to charge a fee, and were therefore acting outside the scope of their agency. A legal aid lawyer 
interviewed agreed that it was difficult to hold the main employer responsible. “We’ve had mixed results 
in terms of the responsiveness of courts, as to whether the employer should have known what the 
recruiter was doing.”
•	 Consular	officials	believed	that	fees	were	charged	across	all	categories	of	visas,	including	those	for	
professional workers. In fact, they noted, those fees tended to be higher, reflecting the higher earning 
potential of B-1, H-1B and L-1 visa holders. 
83 U.S. State Department, 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report, p.377.
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Contractors
Temporary foreign workers may frequently be employed through a third party, who is not the direct beneficiary 
of their labor. These entities tend to have different names in different industries – “farm labor contractors” in 
the H-2A agricultural work context, “staffing agencies” where H-2B workers are concerned, and “job shops” or 
“body shops” when talking about high-tech professionals brought in through B-1, H-1B and L-1 visas.
  Leaked State Department cables indicate a long awareness of problems related to H-2B staffing agencies. 
A 2009 cable from the consulate in Monterrey, Mexico cited examples of staffing agencies “petitioning [for] 
increasing numbers of H-2B temporary worker visas for needs that are neither temporary nor seasonal, but 
year-round,” and found that such fraud “dilutes the benefits of the H-2B program for both H-2B employers 
and their beneficiaries and [...] disadvantages U.S. workers who might want to compete for these jobs.”84  
  Third-party companies obtain L-1 visas for purported intra-company transferees (generally, information 
technology professionals, accountants, or other skilled workers). On arrival in the U.S., these workers are 
then sent off-site to fill temporary vacancies inside the operations of U.S. employers. The L-1 “multinational 
enterprise” essentially functions as a temp agency staffed by foreign workers. Some of these companies 
continue to employ hundreds or even thousands of L-1 workers, even in the wake of efforts at legislative 
reform intended to rein in “multinational temp agencies” or “body shops,” since they have found ways 
around the restrictions.85
  Cynthia Rice of California Rural Legal Assistance pointed to the massive increase in farm labor contrac-
tors – “inching up to about 50% for farms” – and detailed how their presence creates a greater challenge 
in enforcing rights. “Anyone who is in between the worker and the person who benefits financially is an 
impediment to recovery,” she said, “And these contractors often have no land or equipment assets that 
you can make a claim on – so you have to establish employer liability. There is still no presumption of joint 
employer liability under the current regulations.” Rebecca Miller of Georgia Legal Services described the 
ways in which farm employers will deliberately set up contracting arrangements to avoid liability – “they 
will even help their crew leaders incorporate.” 
Advocate Recommendations: 
Some U.S. advocates have called for the registration and disclosure of all intermediaries, in order to limit the 
abuses, though they acknowledge that greater transparency cannot compensate for the many other factors 
that disempower workers in the recruitment process.86  Other advocates insist that employers be required to 
accept responsibility for all recruiter and contractor abuses, as a condition of using any temporary worker visa.87 
One of the most consistent messages from 
advocates in workers’ home countries was 
that the issue of recruitment is a compli-
cated one, and that tackling it appropri-
ately will require creativity. As Mariano 
Yarza, of Catholic Relief Services in Mexico 
noted, the current U.S. visa system treats 
the hiring process as a private matter. In 
the absence of government involvement, workers are effectively required to rely on recruiters, since they have 
no way of making direct contact with U.S. employers. Yarza believed that U.S. advocates should press the U.S. 
government to change this dynamic, and create alternative hiring structures with government supervision. 
Elisabel Enriquez, from Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones en Guatemala, suggested one possible alterna-
tive: that consulates create databases of jobs available, and thus replace the recruiters. One consular official 
acknowledged hearing this demand constantly from workers: “It is a problem that we won’t provide an answer 
to the question, ‘How do I get an H-2 job?’ – but we also say, ‘Don’t pay a recruiter.’ How does that make sense?”
84 U.S. State Department, Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, “Misrepresentations By Staffing Agencies Under The H-2B Temporary Worker Program,” 28 May 2009, available at  
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09MONTERREY201
85 Ron Hira, The H-1B and L-1 Visa Programs: Out of Control p.5.
86 See e.g. Cathleen Caron, “Why Transparency in the Recruiter Supply Chain is Important in the Effort to Reduce Exploitation of H-2 Workers.”
87 Interviews with Rachel Micah-Jones, Jennifer Rosenbaum and Greg Schell.
“In the absence of government involvement, 
workers are effectively required to rely on 
recruiters, since they have no way of making 
direct contact with U.S. employers.”
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In terms of the framing of the problem, several advocates from workers’ home countries pointed out that 
the fraud and misrepresentation may predate what is usually thought of as the moment of recruitment and 
urged that U.S. advocates adopt a correspondingly more expansive campaign to challenge it. For example, 
Tatcee Macabuag of Migrant Forum in Asia pointed to the proliferation of training programs in Philippines 
for those seeking nursing and care-giving programs abroad, taking in ten times as many students as there 
area jobs in “host” countries. She proposed that the U.S. government could play a role in limiting these types 
of abuses, by requiring the registration of these training programs with consulates and embassies, or simply 
by being more transparent about its actual labor market needs, at the current moment and as they are likely 
to evolve over time. 
Economic exploitation: wage theft and beyond
The analysis below of the economic exploitation of temporary foreign workers is concerned with violations 
of legal provisions related to the payment of wages and overtime, and illegal deductions from workers’ 
paychecks. The issue of lawful but potentially unjust cost-shifting, where workers are made to cover expenses 
that are demonstrably for the benefit of the employer, is referenced but not dealt with at length, since it is a 
very distinct problem. Examples of such cost-shifting are explored in the case-study of the J-1 “summer work 
travel” visa, later in this report. Both types of economic exploitation testify to intractably deep imbalances of 
power between temporary workers and their employers, in the current system. 
  Failure to cover the costs of transportation. Case law has developed in support of the principle that employers 
should cover the costs of H-2A and H-2B workers getting to the job. The principle has its foundations both 
in the logic that this helps ensure that U.S. workers do not face unfair competition, and that foreign workers 
should not be subsidizing their employer by taking on expenses that are for the employer’s benefit. Never-
theless, attempts to enforce have faced vigorous resistance from employers. For example, although the 
court’s decision in the Arriaga case in 2002 affirmed that employers should reimburse H-2A workers for visa 
and travel expenses to the place of work during the first week of work,88  employers mounted coordinated 
resistance, which included securing an alternative interpretation on the issue from the Department of 
Labor in the George W. Bush administration. Even though current Department of Labor regulations are very 
clear that visa and transportation costs should be covered by the employer, as Cynthia Rice of California 
Rural Legal Assistance described, many employers are still not complying. A 2011 report by Farmworker 
Justice documents one common way of avoiding the payment of transportation costs: since full travel 
reimbursement is guaranteed only for those employees who have completed the season, employers will 
sometimes force them to quit early.89  These descriptions emphasize how little has changed, since a 1994 
congressional investigation found that nearly 40% of North Carolina’s H-2A workers left early in the season, 
denying them reimbursement for the journey home.90  In other visa categories, where regulations do not 
explicitly require that employers pay for transportation costs, there is no meaningful employer practice of 
doing so. Advocates describe J-1 teachers and nurses,, A-3 and G-5 domestic workers,, and B-1 trainees, 
all taking on debt in order to pay their own way to the job.
  Deductions. Deductions from workers’ paychecks are another way of passing on to workers different 
categories of expenses that are the legal responsibility of employers. Silas Shawver of the Centro de los 
Derechos del Migrante gave some of the most common examples, which, he commented, are typically 
described on pay slips as “miscellaneous.” H-2B workers in the carnival and fair industry have reported 
that they are charged for all bathroom breaks – these are not treated as routine, necessary and negligible 
time off that should be compensated, but even worse, as a form of misconduct, since the deduction is 
out of proportion to the time taken off. Other advocates described H-2 workers being unlawfully forced to 
buy their own protective gear. 
  Failure to pay appropriate wages. Advocates for temporary workers point out that, across the board, 
employers have found ways to avoid paying workers the full quantum of what they are owed for their 
labor. H-2 workers are often paid a piece rate – based on the amount of fruit they pick or the number of 
hotel rooms they clean – and employers will frequently adjust the hours they worked downward, when 
88 See Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Circuit, 2002).
89 Farmworker Justice, No Way to Treat a Guest: Why the H-2A Agricultural Visa Program Fails U.S. and Foreign Workers, 2011. p.16.
90 Oxfam America, Like Machines in the Fields: Workers without rights in American agriculture, 2004. p.49.
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preparing paychecks, to make it appear that the workers were paid the proper hourly rate.91  In other 
industries, workers may be forced to accept a day rate: in one case, Indonesian H-2B oil rig workers were 
forced to work up to 90 hours a week, at a fixed rate of $100 per day.92  In each case, workers were well 
aware that their rights were being violated – but the threat in each case was explicitly the same: If you 
don’t like it, we’ll send you back.
Advocate Recommendations:
A number of U.S. advocates insisted that the regulations of all temporary work visas must reflect the principle 
that expenses incurred for the employer’s benefit should be borne by the employer. 
Among sending country advocates, a different category of economic exploitation, and a different set of 
economic vulnerabilities, were typically at the fore. Several emphasized that most temporary workers in the U.S. 
will return to their home countries with no expectation of any form of retirement security, such as a pension. 
Even the temporary workers who pay social security contributions – H-2B, H-1B, L-1, R-1 and others – will never 
be able to collect the benefits. “Exploitation by the U.S. government is not discussed,” complained an advocate 
from India who had also worked in the U.S. on an H-1B visa. “The U.S. could do so many things differently. They 
could enter into agreements with sending countries so that, for a worker from India, for example, the money 
would be credited to his or her Provident Fund account.” Advocates in Mexico pointed to the Canadian 
model as an example of such an international agreement on social security. Canadian pension benefits are 
successfully routed through the Mexican government, and paid to returned workers on a monthly basis, in 
their home countries.
 
91 Interview with Silas Shawver.
92 Interview with Christopher Willett.
93 Colleen P. Breslin, Stephanie Luce, Beth Lyon & Sarah Paoletti, “Report of the August 2011 Human Rights Delegation to Hershey, Pennsylvania,” 2011, available at  
http://www.guestworkeralliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Human-Rights-Delegation-Report-on-Hersheys-J-1-Workers.pdf. p.1.
94 U.S. State Department, Facts and Figures, J-1 Visa Exchange Visitor Program, available at http://j1visa.state.gov/basics/facts-and-figures; Daniel Costa, Guestworker Diplomacy: J Visas 
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96 Report of the August 2011 Human Rights Delegation to Hershey, Pennsylvania, p.1, 14.
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The J-1 Summer Work Travel Program
In the summer of 2011, nearly 400 foreign students arrived at 
a Hershey’s chocolate company distribution plant in Palmyra, 
Pennsylvania from countries as diverse as China, Ghana, Ukraine, 
and Turkey.93  The students were participants in the U.S. Summer 
Work Travel program, the largest J-1 visa category with 132,342 
participants in 2010 alone.94  While Summer Work Travel students 
typically work at resorts, hotels, restaurants, and amusement parks, 
employers have also included seafood processing plants, farms, 
factories, and warehouses, such as the Hershey’s distribution plant.
The State Department’s official website on J-1 visas maintains that 
“[t]he Summer Work Travel program provides foreign students with 
an opportunity to live and work in the United States during their 
summer vacation from college or university to experience and to 
be exposed to the people and way of life in the United States.”95  
In lieu of a cultural program or the chance the travel, however, 
the students at the Hershey’s plant found themselves laboring 
under isolated and exploitative conditions, lifting boxes weighing 
60 pounds every few seconds, often through the night. After being 
forced to share one-bedroom apartments with four to eight other 
participants,96  the students earned approximately $1 to $3.50 
per hour due to deductions for rent and other exorbitant fees.97 
With the support of the National Guestworkers Alliance, the 
student workers’ protests garnered widespread media coverage 
and national attention in August 2011. Nevertheless, the events 
at the Hershey’s plant are not an anomaly within the Summer 
Work Travel program. While the Summer Work Travel program 
has had a long history of abuse and exploitation, many cases 
fail to attract public attention because students are silenced 
by threats of termination and deportation by sponsors and 
employers. For instance, the Equal Justice Center recently worked 
on a case involving six Russian students who were fired from 
their positions as lifeguards at condominium swimming pools 
after they complained about illegal wage deductions, including 
excessive housing fees.98
In 2010, the Associated Press interviewed nearly 70 Summer 
Work Travel participants in ten different states, most of whom 
expressed frustration with the program. The investigative team 
uncovered cases of students who took shifts sleeping in crowded 
apartments and turned to homeless shelters or churches for free 
meals, with the Ocean City Baptist Church in Maryland serving 
more than 1,700 J-1 students at the time of the investigation. 
One student was left without work upon arriving in South Carolina 
and had to resort to begging in Myrtle Beach until she could 
return to Romania. Another student from Ukraine testified before 
Congress in 2007 that – instead of waitressing and taking English 
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Employer control 
The high degree of employer control over temporary workers’ lives is both a problem in itself, and a major factor 
enabling other forms of exploitation – from the extreme impoverishment of workers described above, to human 
trafficking. This section outlines the types of control that are actually permitted under current visa regulations, 
rather than those that are illegal, such as retaining a worker’s passport, or confinement under lock and key. 
Employer control is present across the range of temporary 
worker visas.. The most significant factor has already been 
noted: workers’ immigration status is tied to the employer. 
This means that they cannot easily leave conditions 
of exploitation. It also means that workers are afraid to 
access even the limited avenues of redress provided by 
the government, under applicable regulations. Workers’ 
fear of being fired and deported runs so deep that an 
employer may never even have to take the illegal step of 
articulating a threat to do so.
Employers are not penalized for asking for more workers than they may actually require, and frequently do 
so, especially in the context of the H-2 visas, the B-1 “in lieu of” H-3 visa and the J-1 “summer work travel” visa. 
They are then free to bring them in (often at workers’ own expense) and keep them waiting until they are 
needed, paying them only for the hours they actually work. With few exceptions – one being the H-2A visa, 
where workers must be compensated for at least 30 hours of work per week –  employers are not violating 
any regulation by doing so. This tactic, sometimes described as “over-asking,” makes workers extremely easy 
99 Holbrook Mohr, Mike Baker and Mitch Weiss, “US Fails to Tackle Student Visa Abuses,” Associated Press, 6 December 2010, available at  
http://www.newsday.com/business/ap-impact-us-fails-to-tackle-student-visa-abuses-1.2520504 .
100 Interview with Pete Meyers. See also Pete Blanchard, “An Exchange Program: How a Local Corporation Uses Foreign Students as a Workforce,” Buzzsaw Magazine, 8 December 2010.
101 Daniel Costa, “Feds Correct to Ban Alaska Fish Processing Jobs from J-1 Visa Program,” Alaska Dispatch, 20 March 2012. 
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/feds-correct-ban-alaska-fish-processing-jobs-j-1-visa-program; Jerry Kammer, “Cheap Labor as Cultural Exchange.”.
102 Daniel Costa, “Feds Correct to Ban Alaska Fish Processing Jobs from J-1 Visa Program,” See also “Southwest Alaska Communities Want J-1 Visa Program Kept Alive,” Fisherman’s News 
Online, 21 March 2012, available at  http://fnonlinenews.blogspot.com/2012/03/southwest-alaska-communities-want-j-1.html.
classes in Virginia as she had been promised – she was forced 
to work in a strip club in Detroit, Michigan after traffickers told 
her at Dulles International Airport that her placement had 
fallen through.99
Other cases may not rise to the level of human trafficking or 
flagrant violations of labor law, but nonetheless implicate 
sponsors and employers who manipulate the Summer Work 
Travel program and place foreign students in vulnerable situa-
tions. In 2010, the Tompkins County Workers Center came 
across seven J-1 students who were paying $200 each per 
week to stay in a motel in Cortland, New York, with multiple 
students to a room, as well as additional above-market costs 
to travel to the Holiday Inn in Ithaca where the students were 
put to work as housekeepers. The Center also discovered 50 
other students from China and Eastern European countries 
at the same motel, working for the Marietta Corporation, a 
company that packages shampoo and other toiletries for 
hotels, who were forced to pay similarly excessive costs for rent 
and transportation. The Department of Labor concluded that 
neither employer violated the law, even though the students 
could barely earn enough money to cover the excessive costs 
and fees of the program.100
Many sponsors and employers take advantage of the work 
component of the Summer Work Travel program, to the complete 
exclusion of any cultural activities. For example, a recruiter for 
Leader Creek Fishing, a fish processing company in Nakenak, 
Alaska, bluntly told prospective student workers that they must 
be able to work “up to 16 hours a day” and that “there’s really 
nothing to do in Nakenak, other than work.” 101 On March 16, 
2012, a group of fish processing companies in Alaska sent a 
letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,opposing a prohibition 
on the placement of Summer Work Travel students in seafood 
processing plants. The industry emphasized the central impor-
tance of J-1 students in filling labor shortages.102
The push for a thorough review of the Summer Work Travel 
program was largely the result of orders from high-level 
government officials, such as the Secretary of State, following 
the events at the Hershey’s distribution plant in 2011. Nonethe-
less, these actions have not translated to consistent reform 
of other J-1 visa categories that are also commonly abused 
by sponsors, recruiters, and employers – such as the interns 
and trainees program – due to the lack of a similar political 
impetus for change in those areas.
“Workers’ fear of being fired 
and deported runs so deep that 
an employer may never even 
have to take the illegal step of 
articulating a threat to do so.”
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to dispose of and to replace, with minimal inconven-
ience to the employer. The threat of denying work is 
also a potent means of amplifying control over workers, 
many of whom may have entered the U.S. already in 
debt to recruiters.
The troubling isolation of temporary workers is another 
factor in their vulnerability, and is typically a mix of the 
psychological and the geographic. H-2A farmworkers, 
J-1 student-workers and au pairs, and A-3/ G-5 domestic 
workers usually live in housing owned or at least 
controlled by the employer; in addition, farmworkers 
are usually in remote rural locations, with little access 
to a support network. 
Employers have also been able to exercise ongoing 
control over skilled temporary foreign workers by inserting 
enormous penalties for breach into employment contracts. 
Patricia Pittman, who teaches in the Department of 
Health Policy at the George Washington University School 
of Public Health and Health Services, and directs the 
Alliance for Ethical International Recruitment Practices, 
described foreign nurses whose contracts specified 
penalties of up to $45,000 for early termination by the 
worker. In many cases, the nurses were only presented 
with the contract on arrival in the U.S., when they had 
few options except to sign; others did not even receive 
copies of the contract that they were bound by.
 
Advocate Recommendations104
A number of U.S. advocates argue that a temporary foreign workers’ visa should be portable, so that it is 
feasible to change employers in the event of mistreatment. “As a condition, it is necessary, but not sufficient,” 
said a professor, who asked not to be identified because of previous ties to the U.S. government. “There are 
many other factors, massive power imbalances, keeping these workers down.”
Advocates from workers’ home countries largely agreed on the issue of visa portability, but more than one 
expressed discomfort with the suggestion that foreign workers were under a dramatically higher degree of 
employer control than low-wage American workers. Given that “power is everywhere, and in all interactions 
between all employers and all workers,” as described by Apoorva Kaiwar, an advocate from India, “we have 
to be more specific to capture what is different about migrant workers.” Home country advocates’ discomfort 
often stems from the concern that broad condemnations of employer control and social isolation in temporary 
foreign labor programs are often used to support the argument that these programs are inherently exploitative, 
and should be ended entirely. For these reasons, they suggest that U.S. advocates begin with a highly specific 
account of mechanisms of employer control, with narrowly-drawn remedies. 
103 U.S. State Department, 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report, p.372.
104 Matter of Vinlaun [sic] v Doyle (60 AD 3d 237 (13 January 2009; Eng, Opinion; Santucci, Angiolillo, Chambers, Concurring)).
Human Trafficking
In recent years, the U.S. government has begun to scrutinize 
its own record on trafficking, documenting and analyzing the 
types of force and fraud that are used to create situations of 
modern-day slavery, within this country’s borders. The govern-
ment’s attention has focused on the disproportionately high 
incidence of trafficking among populations of temporary 
foreign workers.
As the State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons report 
acknowledges, in its section on the U.S., the trafficking of 
temporary foreign workers results, at least in part, from inherent 
regulatory weaknesses in visa frameworks. The report notes 
vulnerability to trafficking across categories, “in visa programs 
for legally documented students and temporary workers 
who typically fill labor needs in the hospitality, landscaping, 
construction, food service, and agricultural industries. There 
are allegations of domestic workers, foreign nationals on A-3 
and G-5 visas, subjected to forced labor by foreign diplomatic 
or consular personnel posted to the United States.”103  Indeed, 
visa regulations in each of these cases create a high degree 
of employer control, and provide for little or no oversight of the 
types of intermediaries (such as recruiters or sub-contractors) 
who are frequently implicated in cases of human trafficking.
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Occupational health and safety
There are relatively few U.S. advocates who address issues of occupational health and safety for temporary 
foreign workers. This is not because the concerns are minor – they are actually among the most significant, 
certainly in the H-2 context. But securing help is extremely challenging, according to advocates interviewed.
“One of our cases involved an H-2B landscaping worker who suffered a debilitating knee injury on the job,” 
recounted Cathleen Caron of the Global Workers Justice Alliance. “After various delays, the company eventu-
ally complied with the law and provided him medical care. But when he returned to Guatemala, after his visa 
expired, the insurance company refused him coverage. We went through three doctors, and none of them 
was equipped to follow the guidelines of the American Medical Association on how to do an evaluation for 
workers’ compensation. The lesson is, if you don’t settle your case before you leave the U.S., you’re in trouble.”
“Workers’ compensation cases are a huge part of our work,” said Rachel Micah-Jones of the Centro de los 
Derechos del Migrante in an interview. The week that the interview took place, the organization was pursuing 
five requests for humanitarian parole visits to the U.S. in connection with workers’ compensation issues: “One 
is the mother of a client in a coma in the U.S., one is a workplace death, where the widow is coming to testify, 
three are workers who were injured.”
The “Sentosa 27”: Nurses Trafficked into the U.S.
In April 2006, 26 nurses and a physical therapist from the Philip-
pines – who became popularly known in the Philippines and in the 
Filipino-American community as the “Sentosa 27” – tried to resign 
from their jobs at nursing facilities in New York State. They did this 
claiming “virtual enslavement,” according to Neri Colmenares, 
a member of Congress from the Philippines who launched an 
investigation into the trafficking of Filipino workers to the U.S.  
 
The nurses were promised positions in nursing facilities, but found 
on their arrival in the U.S. that they had actually become “agency 
nurses” for SentosaCare LLC, which sent them to fill temporary 
staffing shortages at institutions all over New York State. In one case, 
a nurse was sent to a nursing facility where her daily commute 
was two and a half hours in each direction. The wages were much 
lower than had been promised, and the conditions harsher – but 
the sponsoring agency for the nurses, SentosaCare, had put in 
place an almost insurmountable barrier to any attempts to leave 
the job. It had inserted a penalty provision of $25,000 (described 
as “liquidated damages”) into each worker’s contract, which 
would be collected if employment was terminated by the worker.  
 
It should be noted here that the nurses were not on regular 
“temporary worker” visas, but had been brought in on EB-3 
status, which granted them permanent residence in the U.S. 
Nevertheless, the case is an important example, in part because 
it demonstrates that many of the factors that make temporary 
foreign workers vulnerable to exploitation – substantial recruiter 
fees, debt bondage, third-party employment through “body shops” 
or other intermediaries – are present for other migrant workers 
as well. These are further indicators that visa portability across 
employers, or a visa status that allows a “pathway to citizenship,” 
may reduce vulnerability but cannot erase it. 
When the “Sentosa 27” submitted letters of resignation, SentosaCare 
retaliated, filing a $50 million civil suit and a criminal complaint 
accusing the nurses of having endangered patients by their 
“abandonment.” A civil suit for tortious interference with employ-
ment contracts was filed against Felix Vinluan, the lawyer who 
sought to assist them, and he was indicted for criminal solicitation, 
for having advised the nurses that they had the right to resign. 
Other nurses who had been in the process of leaving were terri-
fied by this, and actually bought out their contracts, taking loans 
to pay the $25,000 in “liquidated damages.”
On 13 January 2009, the Appellate Division finally halted the 
prosecutions, concluding that they constituted “an impermissible 
infringement upon the Thirteenth Amendment rights of the nurses 
to be free from involuntary servitude, and the First Amendment 
rights of their attorney.”106 
Colmenares commented that the exploitation of the Sentosa 
27 demonstrated that a secure visa status was no protection 
from trafficking. He blamed lack of attention to the economic 
disparities that make migrants easy to exploit, and also pointed 
to the problematic role of staffing agencies. “The Philippines 
government, through the Overseas Employment Agency, and the 
U.S. government should allow only direct-hire arrangements,” he 
said. He also demanded greater oversight of migrants’ contracts 
in the Philippines as well as in the U.S. “They should never have 
been exposed to three years of mental torture while waiting for 
this case to be resolved. How can a contract with a $25,000 
penalty be considered enforceable?” 
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The rate of injuries among H-2 workers is shockingly high, according to Micah-Jones. “100% of the H-2B women 
workers in the crab picking industry we interviewed had been cut on the job. Among H-2B traveling fair workers, 
none of them have had training on how to put together rides and operate them. We’ve seen quite a few 
injuries and deaths of workers in that industry.”
Bridgette Carr, whose Human Trafficking Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School has handled several 
cases related to injured traveling fair workers, emphasized: “There are many factors at work here. The U.S. 
government, in allowing risky work requiring experience and training to be categorized as ‘unskilled,’ must 
be considered complicit.”
 
Occupational injuries typically spawn a host of further abuses, Micah-Jones explained. “There is usually some 
form of employer retaliation. Those who come forward are often are those who can no longer work, and have 
nothing to lose. But even those who have recovered won’t be rehired, since they’re now considered disabled. 
We’ve even seen cases where employers will promise to pay their medical expenses in Mexico and then get 
them a new visa, but it’s just a scam to get the worker out.”
Advocate Recommendations
U.S. and home country advocates agree that the workers’ compensation model in the U.S. is deeply flawed, 
from the perspective of temporary foreign workers. “Only the H-2A regulations require that all workers be 
covered, across the U.S.,” said Cathleen Caron. “Otherwise, workers’ compensation varies from state to state. 
So H-2Bs, for example, are only covered if they work in an industry that’s covered under that state’s rules.”
For many advocates, this serves as a further reminder of the importance of bilateral agreements between host 
and home country governments. The Jamaican H-2A program, the sole remaining vestige of the US’s bilaterally-
negotiated programs, makes provisions for a wide range of occupational health and safety eventualities, 
including direct payment to Jamaican doctors who treat returned H-2 workers. Canada, as host country for 
temporary foreign workers, ensures workers’ compensation coverage for all temporary foreign workers, with a 
package including medical care and lost wages, accessible in Canada or on return to workers’ home country..
When workers try to complain
It is in the interest of everyone – except 
abusive employers – to have a system that 
encourages workers to come forward to 
report violations of U.S. law. To borrow an 
argument made by Jennifer Gordon, long-
term solidarity between temporary workers 
and U.S. workers – and the preservation of 
U.S. workers own interests – would require 
empowering temporary workers to be able 
to walk away from jobs violating basic 
workplace laws, and reporting employer 
violations.105
However, on paper and in practice, the current system creates obstacles and disincentives, at every level of 
the process: it offers inadequate avenues for redress, and fails to provide sufficient protections to workers who 
experience retaliation if they do try to alert authorities to abuse. 
105 Jennifer Gordon, “Transnational Labor Citizenship,” Southern California Law Review, Vol.80 (2007) p.567.
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Before Workers Leave Their Home Countries
Consular officials all acknowledge that the visa issuance system – the only tool available to them – is a 
“blunt instrument” for dealing with pre-departure problems, such as illegal recruiter fees, or unconscionable 
terms and conditions of employment. Given the limits of U.S. jurisdiction, the officials cannot offer nuanced 
remedies. Their only option is to approve or deny the visa – they do not even have authority to demand that 
the recruiter return an illegal fee, for example. Officials are compelled to deny a visa in such instances, not 
only because fees are prohibited, but also because of fears that workers in an already abusive situation will 
be more vulnerable to trafficking. In any case, since workers are aware that acknowledging recruiter abuses 
will lead to a denial, they have no incentive to come forward. Moreover, as advocates have noted, refusing a 
visa to a worker who has already gone into debt for a job opportunity is likely to deepen an existing problem, 
rather than resolve it. Or, as one consular official put it – “We have only two tools – a hammer and a saw. And 
neither of those is ideal for surgery.”
While in the U.S. 
With the exception of H-2A agricultural workers and the subset of H-2B workers in forestry, temporary foreign 
workers are denied access to federally-funded legal services – free legal aid for low-income people in the U.S. 
This makes access to legal help very difficult, since private attorneys tend to find temporary foreign workers 
unattractive clients – the amounts in dispute are frequently too low to warrant the investment of time. Further-
more, the strong likelihood that the worker will leave the U.S. before the case is over complicates matters further, 
reducing the possibility of a successful outcome.
To the extent that there are protections for workers in the visa regulations, many temporary visas do not have 
a “private right of action” that would enable the visa holder to enforce those provisions. In the absence of 
this right, they are dependent on government agencies. If the agencies do not take action to enforce the 
regulations, workers have no independent authority to do so.
A private right of action would allow the workers to drive the litigation. Sometimes interventions by the Depart-
ment of Labor have had severe unintended consequences, which in turn serve to further disincentivize 
complaints. As Jim Knoepp of the Southern Poverty Law Center commented, penalties imposed on employers 
by the Department of Labor under the H-1B program function in ways that can punish workers. He gave the 
example of 1,044 H-1B teachers employed in Prince George’s County, Maryland, who had paid fees of $10,000 
each to secure their jobs.  In April 2011, the Department of Labor ruled that the county school system owed 
the teachers $4.2 million, imposed an additional $1.7 million in penalties and debarred it from participation 
in the H-1B program for a period of two years. As a consequence, the county was unable to renew any H-1B 
visas, and the workers lost their jobs. 
In the case of domestic workers on A-3 and G-5 visas, which are supervised in their entirety by the State Depart-
ment, the agency has declared itself “not in a position to adjudicate claims of rights violations, to determine 
levels of compensation, to run compensation programs, or to adjudicate civil claims or mediate allegations 
between diplomatic personnel and their employees.”106  The State Department enforcement and monitoring 
role has typically been restricted to keeping a copy of the contracts that domestic workers are asked to show 
when requesting visas, and the agency rejected a Congressional proposal that employers deposit a bond 
to deal with compensation claims.107 
The State Department has been even more active in resisting attempts to address the issue of diplomatic 
immunity, which insulates many diplomat employers of A-3 domestic workers from civil and criminal suits, 
including those related to worker abuse. Jayesh Rathod of the Washington College of Law described the 
agency’s reluctance to engage in “creative legal conversations” to identify avenues toward accountability 
for diplomats. Advocates had proposed, for example, conditioning diplomats’ access to A-3 and G-5 visas for 
their domestic workers on a waiver of diplomatic immunity in the narrow context of the employment relation-
ship. However, the State Department rejected all such proposals. . 
106 Janie A. Chuang, “Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse,” North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 88 (2010) p.1652.
107 United States Code, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1375c(d)(1) and 1375c(d)(2).
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After they return. 
Temporary workers who return to their home countries at the conclusion of their work face many legal and 
practical obstacles to bringing (or pursuing) claims in the U.S. While advocates have sought to address these 
gaps through cross-border collaborations to promote “portable justice,”108  the larger problems remain in 
place. The very requirement that workers leave the U.S. whenever their jobs end is a significant barrier. A very 
few qualify for “T” or “U” visas, designed for foreign citizens who are victims of trafficking and other forms of 
exploitation. These visas enable such individuals to remain in the U.S., on the condition that they cooperate in 
criminal investigations or prosecutions of those involved in the abuse. For all others, there is no option but to 
leave. Once they are back in their home countries, the claims are hard to pursue: travel is likely to be expen-
sive, and visas either difficult or impossible to secure.  Moreover, there are no guarantees that courts will allow 
workers to submit their testimony via telephone or video.  
Retaliatory firing of workers who complain is an issue in itself, of course, in that it serves as a real disincentive 
to worker complaints – especially when the anecdotal evidence is that employers can terminate workers with 
relative impunity. In addition, it is a practical barrier to complaints, since fired workers are quickly sent back 
to their home countries. Christopher Willett of the Equal Justice Center described a group of landscaping 
workers who had been fired and immediately given bus tickets back to Mexico when they complained to the 
employer about working conditions. “It’s only by chance that they got in touch with us,” he noted. There are 
no routine efforts by the Department of Labor to check whether early departures of temporary workers may 
have resulted from employer retaliation.
Advocate Recommendations
Some U.S. advocates, and a number of home country advocates, cautioned against locating the issue of 
complaints and avenues of redress in too narrow a context. As Jayesh Rathod of the Washington College 
of Law pointed out, workers face a real risk of being “blacklisted” from future employment in the U.S. if they 
complain about working conditions, as documented later in this report. Thus, the “access to justice” narra-
tive must be understood as being in deep tension with the “access to stable employment” that workers also 
desperately need. 
U.S. and home country advocates generally agreed that it is necessary to assert a broad demand for U.S. 
accountability, for its failure to ensure compliance with its own laws and policies regarding the protec-
tion of temporary foreign workers, and its failure to make adequate provisions for access to justice in the 
U.S. At the same time, some home country advocates suggested equal attention to laws in workers’ home 
countries. “Access to justice should actually be about binational justice,” proposed Alejandra Ancheita of 
ProDESC in Mexico. “There are provisions in Mexican labor law about the rights of workers traveling to the other 
countries – we should also be thinking together about better enforcement in Mexico.” 
Aroldo Palacios, a lawyer in Guatemala who is part of the Global Workers Defender Network, suggested that 
U.S. consulates should have the responsibility to ensure that employers have complied with domestic laws, prior 
to granting visas. He noted that there are many protective provisions in Guatemalan law regarding migrant 
workers’ rights: “Foreign companies can’t sign contracts with Guatemalan workers without the permission of 
the Ministry of Labor. Foreign employers are required to make a deposit in a bank account as a bond, before 
a worker departs. Why doesn’t the U.S. Consulate make sure that these steps have been taken?”
Other home country advocates noted that the U.S. justifies broad failures to act in defense of temporary 
foreign workers by pointing to institutions in workers’ home countries which ostensibly fulfill that purpose. “But 
the U.S. won’t partner with our government; it allows its employers to side-step our laws, and so it hollows out 
our institutions,” complained one Filipino government official. “Whatever else we demand, we have to demand 
that they be accountable throughout the process, from recruitment to return.”
The central message that emerges from interviews with U.S. advocates, and home country advocates is that 
the problems of abuse of foreign workers are closely linked to the particular weaknesses in U.S. government 
regulation and oversight identified earlier in this report. The U.S. government has the ability to address these 
108 See Cathleen Caron, “Portable Justice, Global Workers and the United States,” Clearinghouse Review, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, January–February 2007, pp. 549-57.
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flaws, and close the gaps currently exploited by recruiters and employers. Its failure to act rankles U.S. and 
foreign advocates. “The U.S. exercises power over us when it doesn’t regulate what’s happening in its own 
country,” said an Indian trade unionist. “This story is not about evil employers, because it is in human nature 
to see an opportunity to make money off someone else, and want to take it. The purpose of regulation is to 
keep us from temptation.” 109
There are very specific measures that should be taken. Some short-term measures would include a role for 
Department of Labor oversight for visas where there currently is none, and clear, secure avenues for workers 
challenge abuse with reduced fear of retaliation. In the longer term, the U.S. should explore ways to cooperate 
with workers’ home country governments to limit abuses by recruiters, and to ensure that critically-needed social 
protections for returned workers – such as retirement benefits and workers’ compensation – are accessible. 
The visas could also be re-structured in 
ways that place limits on employer control. 
De-linking the visa status from the employ-
ment relationship would be an important 
step. While this would be a major change, 
many have proposed that the visa could 
be re-designed to be sector- and region-
specific instead, with Department of Labor 
supervision of any change in employment. 
According to Alejandra Gordillo, head of the Guatemalan agency coordinating governmental efforts in 
support of their migrants, “an overarching aspect of the guestworker experience is living with fear.” Regulatory 
fixes cannot be expected to resolve everything. But they would provide a solid foundation for the social and 
economic transformations necessary to address the deeper imbalances of power. 
109 Farm Labor Organizing Committee and Oxfam America, A State of Fear: Human Rights Abuses in North Carolina’s Tobacco Industry, 2011. p.42.
Blacklisting
The fear of retaliatory termination that undergirds all of the 
other barriers documented above, is accompanied by the fear 
of being “blacklisted” – being denied any further opportunity to 
work in the U.S., by the recruiter or by the employer. Their joint 
force makes workers extremely reluctant to use even the narrow 
avenues of complaint that exist. 
“An employer can blacklist with impunity,” stated Silas Shawver of 
the Centro de los Derechos del Migrante. “All they have to say to 
the recruiter is, ‘I don’t want that worker again,’ and it’s done.” The 
majority of workers who report blacklisting to the organization 
have not been involved in concerted or sustained action, or union 
organizing – often, the employer may be reacting to a one-time, 
individual act of protest, such as worker raising a concern about 
workplace safety, speaking up in support of another worker who 
was fired, or questioning wage deductions on a paycheck. 
There have been numerous efforts to fight back against black-
listing, addressing the lack of safeguards and remedies in U.S. 
law through private contract, or settlement agreements following 
litigation: 
•	 The Farm Labor Organizing Committee’s collective bargaining 
agreement with the North Carolina Growers’ Association, covering 
thousands of H-2A workers, has a specific provision that creates 
a grievance mechanism, and protections against both retalia-
tory termination and blacklisting. In 2010 alone, the Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee processed more than 700 complaints, 
many relating to wages and workplace safety.109 
•	Rebecca Miller of Georgia Legal Services emphasized the impor-
tance of being proactive, in litigation contexts, with respect to 
blacklisting. “When workers come and talk to us about problems 
at a farm, we ask them right away, ‘Is this a place you want to 
return to?’ We counsel them to cross their ‘T’s and dot their ‘I’s 
in the re-application, so that the facts are in place to identify 
any discrimination or blacklisting in a failure to re-hire.” She 
acknowledged, however, how difficult retaliation issues can 
be. “In 2005 we filed suit on behalf of H-2A workers regarding 
the employer’s failure to reimburse them for their travel, and 
underpayment of wages – and as part of the settlement, they 
promised that workers would be able to return. But each year 
it was a struggle, and finally the farm simply withdrew from the 
H-2A program – it just shows how determined employers can 
be to retaliate.” 
“This story is not about evil employers, 
because it is in human nature to see an 
opportunity to make money off someone 
else, and want to take it. The purpose of 
regulation is to keep us from temptation.” 
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Perspectives from Workers’ 
Home Countries
This report is concerned with analyzing the temporary work visa system from the point of view of U.S. advocates 
and the lens of U.S. policy. But efforts to frame a more effective and responsive policy in the U.S. must draw 
on the realities in workers’ home countries, including the perspectives of advocates and government officials. 
Foreign governments unable to protect their own citizens
The current fragmented, opaque, and highly privatized approach to temporary foreign labor in the U.S. promotes 
a damaging dynamic among sending country governments that contributes to the dysfunction and abuse 
documented previously in this report. It forces workers’ home countries to compete with each other for the 
attention of U.S. employers in a “race to the bottom,” each trying to offer them as cheap and under-regulated 
an environment for recruitment as possible.
At the same time, home country governments are profoundly disempowered vis a vis the government of the 
U.S. The unilateral structure of the temporary foreign worker system gives them no standing to discuss abuses 
of their citizens with the U.S. government.. Since the U.S. government engages in virtually no oversight of, or 
restraints on, U.S. employers in their sourcing of workers, there is further disincentive for governments to speak 
up in defense of their citizens. If the home country government does complain, employers are free to shift from 
one country to another virtually overnight, abandoning whole communities that have come to rely on the jobs. 
As a result, workers’ home country governments describe having to cater to employer caprice. They even find 
themselves having to engage seriously with racist stereotypes, for example, arguing the relative desirability of 
a Thai worker compared to a Mexican worker. Such stereotypes could be challenged through litigation, were 
these hiring choices taking place inside the U.S.
Most of the U.S. commentators interviewed expressed sympathy for the dilemma confronting home country 
governments. The sympathy emerged out of the recognition that these countries are trapped in a larger 
dynamic that is hard to control. As U.S. advocates note, the dynamic plays out not only in negotiations between 
U.S. employers and home country governments, but even in highly localized ways at individual work sites. “In 
Washington State, there will be farms with 700 Mexicans and 400 Jamaicans – the employer will pit them 
against each other,” described Erik Nicholson of the United Farmworkers. “It is an implicit or explicit threat to 
the government, not just to the workers. So we’re not surprised when sending countries say, ‘we’d love to stand 
up for our workers, but then another country will just step in.’”
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Beyond a unilateral and privatized approach:  
empowering home countries
A survey of temporary visa schemes around 
the world reveals a spectrum of degrees 
and forms of government involvement, both 
among workers’ home countries as well as 
countries hosting foreign workers. The U.S. is 
at one extreme, treating the employment 
relationship between U.S. employers and 
foreign workers as a private arrangement, 
and keeping its engagement with workers’ 
home country governments to an absolute 
minimum. Other “host countries” are much 
more involved in regulating the employment relationships, and in engaging with workers’ home countries, often 
through negotiated bilateral agreements that cover issues such as worker protection and routine sharing of 
information. While the U.S. approach largely eliminates a role for home countries, other approaches produce 
meaningful collaborations.
Many of the countries sending workers to the U.S. maintain and pursue negotiated agreements with 
other “host countries.” Thus, when governments and advocates in workers’ home countries comment on the 
The U.S. is at one extreme, treating the 
employment relationship between U.S. 
employers and foreign workers as a private 
arrangement, and keeping its engagement 
with workers’ home country governments 
to an absolute minimum.
The U.S. and Jamaica: the pitfalls and potential of bilateral arrangements
Historically, the U.S. negotiated bilateral agreements on temporary 
labor migration with workers’ home countries. The U.S.-Jamaica 
agricultural program is the last relic of this history.
Under the U.S.-Jamaica H-2A program, the Jamaican Ministry of 
Labour undertakes multiple roles related to recruitment, hiring 
and worker welfare schemes. The Ministry is even a party to the 
employment contract between workers and U.S. employers.
Andrea Miller-Stennett, Director of Overseas Employment at the 
Jamaican Ministry of Labour, outlined the process: “We arrange 
for health checks and criminal background checks for all appli-
cants, and then put approved workers into a pool so that they 
can be sent on demand. Employers specify how many workers 
they want and for what purpose, and then the government of 
Jamaica supervises the selection process, puts them through 
trainings, and arranges for travel. The workers don’t even have 
to go to the consulate for a visa.” Until recently, she noted, the 
Jamaican government also provided social welfare schemes – 
health insurance, a compulsory savings scheme, and welfare 
officers based in the U.S. – funding them through small deduc-
tions from workers’ paychecks. However, the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s H-2A regulations bar recruiter fees of all forms, and 
the Jamaican government deductions have been interpreted 
as prohibited fees.
There is of course much that remains unsaid in this description, 
and questions have been raised by U.S. advocates about whether 
the government’s role – in managing the program, or the welfare 
schemes – ultimately serves workers’ interests. Greg Schell of 
Florida Legal Services mentions instances where the government 
collaborated with employers to blacklist “troublemakers” – they 
were put on a “U” list (for Unavailable) and screened out. “The 
employers couldn’t be accused of discriminating, but that’s 
because the Jamaican government was doing it for them.” He 
also questioned the value of the Ministry of Labour’s training 
program, noting that it included no discussion of workers’ rights 
– “not even minimum wage levels.” The content of the trainings 
is oriented towards avoiding conflict between employers and 
workers, and advises workers to “fit in and keep your head down,” 
according to Schell.
Nevertheless, Schell concedes that Jamaican H-2As tend to be 
much better off than those from other countries. “The government 
charges next to nothing, in comparison with private recruiters,” 
he noted, “and with the liaison program, they had a way to send 
back their savings without having to pay hefty fees to Western 
Union.” Unlike all other workers in the U.S. on temporary visas – 
including, for that matter, Jamaican H-2B workers – H-2A workers 
from Jamaica are also able to rely on a relatively seamless 
workers’ compensation scheme, and are entitled to Social Security 
benefits on retirement. As Schell describes it, in the final analysis, 
the involvement of home country governments in the temporary 
foreign labor programs is “probably the better of bad choices.”
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strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. approach, it should be understood that they are explicitly or implicitly 
considering the relationship with the U.S. against the backdrop of these other relationships. 
Most U.S. advocates support closer cooperation with workers’ home countries, though some remain ambivalent 
about bilateral agreements. They have few illusions about the current capacity and political will of workers’ 
home country governments. There is deep frustration among U.S. advocates and scholars that mechanisms 
implemented by these governments – apparently for the protection of workers’ rights – often function as means 
to suppress complaints and protests. According to Cindy Hahamovitch, a professor at William and Mary who 
has written extensively on Jamaican temporary workers in the U.S., this is the role played by Jamaican Liaison 
Officers. “The Liaison Officers will help you get home if your father has died, but they won’t advocate for you 
with your boss,” she said. “Their job is tell workers how not to get in trouble, and if they try to go beyond that, the 
employer will tell them, ‘Well, in that case we can always get Mexicans or Haitians’ – so they quickly learn. So 
if a worker complains about unpaid wages, the Liaison Officer’s response is, ‘Be quiet, or you’ll be sent home.’” 
Hahamovitch’s position typifies advocate opinions of similar officials in Mexican, Indian and Filipino consulates. 
In some cases, home country governments have more elaborate schemes to protect migrant workers but, 
as Robyn Rodriguez, a professor at Rutgers University, has pointed out, a larger number of institutions is no 
guarantee of effective implementation. The Philippines – with its thick web of training, welfare and employment 
promotion agencies for migrant workers – is frequently held up as a model for home country practice. However, 
as Rodriguez has argued, these agencies are no more successful since their primary purpose is to promote 
the country’s labor export model, and they are ultimately willing to sacrifice workers’ well being to that end.110 
Advocates in workers’ home countries – and even governments – did not disagree with these analyses. “Officials 
of the Philippines will always encourage workers to go back, rather than to stay and demand their rights,” 
asserted Rina Anastacio of Migrante International in the Philippines. However, many advocates also noted that 
home country governments’ hands are tied in important respects. Officials within the labor departments of a 
few countries pointed, tentatively, to ways in which U.S. government action or inaction was making their job 
more difficult – but most were extremely cautious about saying anything that could be construed as critical.
  Several officials noted that the U.S. government should consider placing limitations on its employers – the 
ones propelling the “race to the bottom” – and require them to enter into long-term sourcing relationships 
with workers’ home countries, or else involve itself directly in the relationships. A U.S. guarantee of long-term 
access to certain numbers of jobs would help reduce the power of employers, who constantly threaten 
to shift their sourcing to other countries.
  An official at the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor expressed a wish that the U.S. would share information 
on the contracts that workers sign, and the work sites where they go. “It would enable me to do my job 
better,” he hastened to add. “We don’t want to 
intervene in the private nature of the program 
and the contracts, but information on worker 
flows would let us fulfill the obligations of 
Guatemala as a state to its citizens.” As noted 
above, Guatemalan law actually requires that 
migrant workers’ contracts be deposited by 
the employer with the Ministry of Labor, along 
with details on the nature and location of the 
work, to enable consular officials to ensure 
their welfare.
  “The U.S. does not treat its visa system as a 
‘program’ with a role for sending country 
governments,” said Elisabel Enriquez, from 
Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones en Guatemala. “So if our Ministry of Labor wants to be involved in 
monitoring conditions in an ongoing way, they are treated by the U.S. as though they are interfering in 
another country’s affairs.” Julián Adem Díaz de León, of Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that 
workers themselves think of the U.S. visa system as a program, developed in partnership with Mexico. “So 
110 Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World, University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
“The U.S. does not treat its visa system 
as a ‘program’ with a role for sending 
country governments, …so if our 
Ministry of Labor wants to be involved 
in monitoring conditions in an ongoing 
way, they are treated by the U.S. as 
though they are interfering in another 
country’s affairs.”
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they think that any recruiter’s table in the plaza has the blessing of the authorities,” he explained. “If there 
were a program in place, it would be easier for the Mexican government to support workers.”
  The extremely asymmetrical relationship between home country governments and the U.S. – both employers 
and the government – is clear in a comment made by one foreign government official based here. “When 
we receive complaints from one of our workers, we usually go to a non-profit organization and ask them 
to take it up without mentioning us,” the official said. “We don’t want the employer to know, and we don’t 
want the State Department to find out. There are some people in the U.S. Department of Labor that we 
trust, but otherwise we don’t advocate directly.”
Cross-border  
Advocacy Partnerships:  
challenges and opportunities
U.S. advocates widely recognize the importance of 
shaping long-term relationships with advocates in 
workers’ home countries, in order to develop a textured 
understanding for any intervention, from litigation to 
organizing. 111
At the level of rhetoric, there are clear stumbling-blocks, 
however. U.S. advocates often charge foreign advocates 
with a willingness to “trade rights for access,” prioritizing 
continued employment in the U.S. over a workers’ rights 
agenda. Equally frequently, foreign advocates allege 
that U.S. advocacy agendas boil down to protectionism 
(simply wishing to keep foreign workers out) and pater-
nalism (focusing on rights in a way that substitutes U.S. 
advocates’ judgment and morality for that of foreign 
workers themselves).
At a practical level, experience indicates that U.S. 
advocacy priorities are unlikely to be advanced 
through collaboration with traditional partners, such 
as unions, through traditional means, such as joint 
organizing. This is because several non-negotiable 
issues for U.S. unions are not a high priority for home 
country unions. “Over the last five years, we have done 
a lot of work in sending countries, a lot of engagement 
with policy with foreign governments, and have had 
a lot of conversations with foreign country advocates,” 
said Erik Nicholson of the United Farm Workers, “and it’s 
clear that the right to organize, or the right to change 
employers, is part of our agenda, not theirs. Unions in 
sending countries don’t really think too much about 
the people going abroad, or else they look down on 
them as selling out.”
With a few exceptions, home country unions agreed 
with this assessment. “From our perspective, Jamaican 
migrants in the U.S. are not there to form a union,” 
111 Ana Avendaño, “Reintegration and Circular Migration – Effective for Development?” (draft, 31 July 2009, copy on file).
Canada-Mexico Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Program
In Mexico, critiques of the U.S. government’s handling of its 
temporary visa system inevitably involve comparisons to the 
Canada-Mexico Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, which 
involves 18,000 workers traveling from Mexico every year. “The 
National Employment Service processes the visa – they don’t 
even have to go to the Canadian consulate,” described a Mexican 
Department of Labor official. “They are guided until they get on 
the airplane – and once they arrive in Canada, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs takes over. They have an actual mandate to visit 
farms and inquire into workers’ welfare. On the other hand, up 
to 60,000 Mexicans travel to the U.S. every year on H-2As and 
we don’t even have the right to know where they are.”
Advocates in Mexico, Canada as well as in the U.S. have 
cautioned against treating the Canadian program as the “gold 
standard,” as Ana Avendaño of the AFL-CIO puts it. She pointed 
to problems that include routine discrimination – not favoring 
young, single men, as in the U.S. context, but rather married 
men with children, on the assumption that they are less likely 
to overstay their visas.113 
Nevertheless, there is general agreement that the Canadian 
program has crucial provisions to promote Mexican workers’ 
welfare, in ways lacking in the U.S. visa system. “At least the 
Canada-Mexico program is integrated into state policy and 
practice on both sides, so there are better protections against 
recruiter abuses here, or blacklisting,” commented Mariano 
Yarza of Catholic Relief Services in Mexico. “The Mexican 
government can do nothing – or worse than nothing – unless 
the U.S. government is willing to let it intervene in conversa-
tions related to migration policy.”
The Canada-Mexico program also provides for access to the 
Canadian health care system, disability insurance, and a 
pension. “The social safety nets are very important,” said Yarza. 
“For Mexican workers in the U.S., they aren’t protected here 
and they aren’t protected there.”
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explained a leader of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. “They are there to make as much money as 
possible, and then come back. Many of them are our members before they leave, and we will try to keep 
their jobs for them until they return. When they are in the U.S., their problems are somebody else’s problem.” 
It is worth giving some nuance to the position articulated by unions in workers’ home countries. First, it is not 
a rejection of partnerships with U.S. unions, but rather, a call to refine a common agenda, so that joint trade 
union advocacy on temporary foreign labor focuses on issues that have a demonstrable short-term impact 
felt in both countries. Recruitment abuses, blacklisting, wage theft and occupational health and safety were 
commonly cited. 
Second, it is not a rejection of joint union organizing of 
temporary migrants. But, as unions in the Philippines and 
Jamaica emphasized, it is important for transnational trade 
union solidarity around temporary work programs to begin 
with solidarity among workers’ home countries, to create 
bulwarks against the “race to the bottom.” Padre Mauro 
Verzeletti of the Pastoral de Movilidad Humana described 
this regional dilemma: “Our work will have to be shaped across civil society in Central America. If Guatemala 
tries to stand up alone, they will just look to El Salvador and Honduras for workers. So the first priority is to come 
to an agreement with and among organizations in these countries.”
However, as emphasized by Jayesh Rathod of the Washington College of Law, U.S. advocates need partner-
ships with home country advocates, since effective interventions in the U.S. are dependent on a principled 
understanding of the larger contexts. As Rathod described, the economies of workers’ home towns, the 
structures of family relationships, the social positioning of recruiters, are all relevant to understanding workers’ 
vulnerability, and the choices they make. This has meant, then, different types of long-term partnerships. U.S. 
advocates may not necessarily be able to find exact counterparts, equally focused on issues of temporary 
migration or worker organizing, but increasingly, are engaging with home country organizations working more 
broadly on human rights, economic justice, national development, or rural poverty.
“If Guatemala tries to stand 
up alone, they will just look 




The problems across the U.S. temporary worker visa 
system run very deep. They will require immediate 
attention to several urgent priorities, as well as 
sustained policy review over time. 
The long-term vision must be of a unitary visa system 
with uniform oversight, rather than a multiplicity of visas, 
regulated differently. While there are many legitimate 
interests represented by the numerous categories that constitute the current framework, it should be possible 
to address the “temporary labor” dimensions in an integrated manner, while still facilitating genuine “cultural 
exchange,” “foreign student enrollment,” and “travel for business and pleasure.” An important facet of such a 
system would be consistent public administration, rather than the delegation of essential responsibilities to 
private entities, such as employers and recruiters, whose own interests inevitably inhibit their ability to prioritize 
public policy goals. 
Such a system must be based on a sophisticated understanding of “labor shortages,” recognizing and 
challenging the ways in which they can be artificially constructed through the erosion of wages and working 
conditions for U.S. workers. This is a necessity, if a temporary foreign labor program is to adequately protect 
U.S. and foreign workers. Under the current system, there is little effort to understand the barriers and disincen-
tives that amount to the displacement or replacement of U.S. workers. Even under the best of circumstances, 
the U.S. government’s approach to investigating discrimination against U.S. workers is limited to determining 
whether an eligible U.S. applicant was refused work, or terminated from a job. 
Meaningful public administration, which addresses the current gaps in protections for foreign workers, also 
requires that the U.S. return to systematic cooperation with home country governments, potentially through 
the negotiation of bilateral agreements. This would reduce pre-departure abuses, such as recruiter fraud, and 
would also help returned workers, ensuring that they have access to social security benefits accrued during 
their time in the U.S., or to workers’ compensation in the event of workplace accidents or illnesses.
While working toward this goal, there are a number of intermediate measures possible, requiring the U.S. to 
play a stronger role in regulation of the visas and to take control away from private employers and recruiters. 
Some commonsense steps could include posting information on available jobs directly, through individual U.S. 
consulates, or through partnerships with ministries of labor in workers’ home countries. Greater transparency 
would also promote public accountability: information on which U.S. employers are seeking foreign workers 
through these visas and for what types of jobs would help check misuse of these programs, for example.  
If the U.S. were indeed to expand its understanding of temporary foreign worker arrangements beyond the 
private contract between employers and employees, it could also take the step of issuing visas that are linked, 
not to an individual employer, but rather to a economic sector or region experiencing a demonstrated labor 
shortage. Such a visa could, with appropriate Department of Labor supervision, allow for workers to change 
employers, thus reducing the employer control that is such a key element of worker vulnerability.
In order to situate temporary foreign labor programs within broader U.S. labor market policy, and to promote 
transparency and accountability to the public, it would be helpful to put in place a “permanent, independent 
Commission on Foreign Workers,” such as that proposed by former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall and the
“The long-term vision must be of 
a unitary visa system with uniform 
oversight, rather than a multiplicity 
of visas, regulated differently.”
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Economic Policy Institute.112  As currently imagined, such a Commission would be able to collect data on 
labor shortages, temporary work visas, and the economic impact of temporary foreign workers in the U.S. It 
could then analyze this data to inform the U.S. public and policymakers about the costs and benefits of the 
choices available.
Such a Commission would also serve the interests of foreign workers, and inform the labor market policy 
choices made by foreign governments whose citizens work in the U.S. At a minimum, a more predictable system, 
offering accurate public information about labor market trends in the U.S., and projected needs, would help 
“inoculate” workers against intermediaries who make their money fraudulently training or recruiting workers 
for non-existent jobs.
Another important medium-term goal involves better protections for workers who face employer retaliation 
when they come forward with complaints about exploitation, or organize in defense of their rights. A model 
that has already been developed is the POWER Act, legislation first introduced in 2010. The draft bill provides for 
temporary immigration status and the right to work legally anywhere in the U.S. to workers who come forward 
to report workplace violations; the provisions would apply to temporary workers across all visa categories, as 
well as to unauthorized workers.
In terms of immediate measures, there are several that are highlighted here:
  The Department of Labor must be integrated into the oversight of all visa categories that enable temporary 
work in the U.S. It should be empowered to assess the potential displacement of U.S. workers, as well as to 
establish and enforce appropriate wages and working conditions for foreign workers. 
  The U.S. must release consolidated and consistent data about the use of these visas, including the names of 
employers currently recruiting foreign workers. Given pressing concerns about discrimination in recruitment, 
statistics on workers, particularly those related to age and gender, should also be disclosed. Employers 
should be required to disclose all arrangements with recruiters and labor contractors, and to accept full 
responsibility for fraud, discrimination, or economic exploitation by intermediaries. 
  Some steps of cooperation with foreign governments should be initiated immediately, to address the 
ways in which workers can fall into the cracks between U.S. law and the laws that could protect them in 
their home countries. For example, U.S. consular officials could take the relatively minor step of verifying 
basic elements of compliance with home countries’ labor protections for migrant workers, in the process 
of granting workers a visa.
Underlying all of these conclusions, however, there is another inescapable one. The sheer size and reach of 
the temporary visa system, whatever else it may mean, reveals the extent to which immigration policy has 
grown very distant from its deep roots in permanent labor migration. The national conversations that are 
periodically initiated on broad questions of immigration and labor policy in the U.S. – most recently in the 
context of discussions related to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act in 2007 – have stalled or been 
silenced. These conversations must begin again.
112 Ray Marshall, Value Added Immigration: Lessons for the United States from Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, Economic Policy Institute, 2011.
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Appendix A:  
Organizations Consulted for this Report
AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations)
Umbrella federation for U.S. trade unions, representing over 12 million working people.
Alliance for Ethical International Recruitment Practices
Multi-stakeholder initiative to promote better practices in the recruitment of foreign-educated health profes-
sionals to the U.S.
Alliance of Progressive Labor
Labor center in the Philippines bringing together trade unions and other labor organizations in support of 
workers’ rights. 
American Federation of Teachers
Union in the U.S. whose membership includes teachers, college and university faculty, government employees, 
and nurses.
Asia Pacific Mission for Migrants
Regional center based in Hong Kong, dedicated to supporting strong migrant workers’ movements through 
advocacy, networking and education.
Beijing Legal Aid Office for Migrant Workers
Organization providing free legal advice and services to Chinese migrant workers (internal and cross-border), 
through 21 offices across China.
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union 
Trade union in Jamaica, with a substantial membership in agricultural and food processing industries. .
California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. 
Nonprofit legal services program with 21 offices throughout California. 
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Catholic Relief Services 
The official international humanitarian agency of the Catholic community  that carries out the commitment 
of the Bishops of the United States to assist the poor and vulnerable overseas.
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante 
Organization that supports Mexico-based migrant workers to defend and protect their rights as they move 
between their home communities in Mexico and their workplaces in the United States.
Centro Independiente de Trabajadores Agrícolas 
Non-profit organization operating in the U.S. and Mexico to help employers in the agriculture industry recruit 
foreign workers, and to improve working and living conditions for farmworkers.
China Labour Bulletin
Non-governmental organization based in Hong Kong, involved in research and advocacy on workers’ rights 
in China.
Coalition of Immokalee Workers
Membership-based organization of low-wage immigrant and migrant workers in Immokalee, Florida, with a 
majority of its members in farm work.
Economic Policy Institute
Think tank focused on policy related to low- and middle-income workers.
Equal Justice Center
Public interest law firm based in Texas, focused on basic employment rights for low-wage workers.
Farm Labor Organizing Committee
Labor union representing migrant farm workers in the Midwestern United States and North Carolina.
Farmworker Justice
Non-profit organization in the U.S. supporting farmworkers through litigation, public education, coalition-
building, and advocacy.
Florida Legal Services, Migrant Farmworker Justice Project 
Organization providing legal advocacy to farmworkers across the state of Florida.
Friends of Farmworkers
Organization assisting migrant and immigrant workers across Pennsylvania with employment-related claims.
Georgia Legal Services Program – Farmworker Rights Division
Civil litigation organization focused on the employment rights of farmworkers in Georgia.
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Global Workers Defender Network
Project of Global Workers Justice Alliance; support network of human rights organizations and individual 
advocates in workers’ home countries.
Human Trafficking Clinic at the University of Michigan Law School
Clinical legal education program representing and advocating for U.S. and foreign victims of trafficking.
International Human Rights Clinic at American University Washington College of Law
Clinical legal education program representing clients in cases involving established and emerging human 
rights norms. 
Kilusang Mayo Uno
Trade union federation in the Philippines, recently challenging extrajudicial killings of labor leaders.
Mesa Nacional para las Migraciones en Guatemala
Coalition of civil society in Guatemala, focused on the protection of migrants and their families. 
Migrant Forum in Asia
Regional network of migrants’ rights organizations and individual advocates supporting migrants; the secre-
tariat office is in the Philippines.
Migrante International
Organization supporting Overseas Filipino Workers in partnership with more than 90 organizations in 22 “host” 
countries.
Migration Policy Institute
Think tank in Washington D.C. analyzing and evaluating policy related to migrants and refugees.
National Employment Law Project 
Advocacy organization promoting policies and programs in support of workers’ rights and unemployed workers.
National Guestworkers Alliance
Membership organization of guestworkers across the United States; a project of the New Orleans Workers’ 
Center for Racial Justice.
 New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice
Brings together projects organizing day laborers, guestworkers, and homeless residents in New Orleans.
New Trade Union Initiative 
National federation in India, bringing together trade unions independent of affiliations to political parties.
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Partido ng Manggagawa
Political party and network of trade unions in the Philippines, focused on working class mobilization in govern-
ment.
Pastoral de La Movilidad Humana
Episcopal organization supporting migrants, refugees and trafficked persons across Central and North America, 
and the Caribbean. 
ProDESC (Proyecto de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales)  
Non governmental organization based in Mexico, focused on the advancement of economic, social and 
cultural rights.
PSLINK
Union of public sector workers in the Philippines; networks internationally on behalf of members in education, 
health care, and elder care who are involved in temporary migrant labor.
Service Employees International Union
Union of more than 2 million workers in the U.S. and Canada, with members in health care, property services 
and public services. 
Southern Poverty Law Center
Civil rights organization promoting racial and social justice through litigation, education, and advocacy. 
Tompkins County Workers Center
Membership-based organization in upstate New York, addressing workplace justice and other social and 
economic issues. 
United Farmworkers
Union organizing across major agricultural industries in 10 states of the U.S. 
United Food and Commercial Workers, Canada
Private sector trade union in Canada, with a substantial membership of foreign workers in Canada on tempo-
rary visas.
University and Allied Workers Union
Trade union in Jamaica with a large proportion of members from sugarcane and allied industries, including 
many returned workers from the U.S.
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